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Formal languages for policy have been developed for access control and conformance
checking. In this paper, we describe a formalism that combines features that have been
developed for each application. From access control, we adopt the use of a saying operator.
From conformance checking, we adopt the use of operators for obligation and permission.
The operators are combined using an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf
of another. The combination yields beneﬁts to both applications. For access control, we
overcome the problematic interaction between hand-off and classical reasoning. For con-
formance, we obtain a characterization of legal power by nesting saying with obligation
and permission.
The axioms result in a decidable logic. We integrate the axioms into a logic programming
approach, which lets us use quantiﬁcation in policies while preserving decidability of ac-
cess control decisions. Conformance checking, in the presence of nested obligations and
permissions, is shown to be decidable. Non-interference is characterized using reachability
via permitted statements.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Access control is an important problem in trust management systems. Informally, a trust management system involves a
set of actors or principals, and a set of controlled or regulated actions, e.g., accessing medical information, or downloading
a song. The goal of such a system is to administrate requests to perform actions. Trust management systems are commonly
decomposed into two (interacting) components [1]: (a) authentication – determining the source of a request, and (b) access
control – determining whether a request is permitted according to a policy. Abadi et al. [3] cast access control as a problem
for logic. We assume as given an action (p), which is controlled by a principal (A), and a request to perform p from a principal
(B). Access is granted if we can prove, using A’s policy, that A says that B is permitted to perform p. In access control logics,
such as [1–3,16,17], says is treated as a (modal) operator. However, the use of an operator for permission has not been
explored.
The concept of representation is prevalent in access control policies, and it forms the central focus of thiswork. Representa-
tion arises in situationswhere a principal is held to declarationsmadeonher behalf (cf. [18]). For example, consider a scenario
where a software company authorizes project managers to permit their team members to access the production server. If a
project manager says that a team member is permitted to access the server (on behalf of the company), we conclude that
the company says that the team member is permitted to access the server. In such a scenario, project managers represent
the company on permitting access to the server. All access control logics provide principals with the capability to let other
principals represent them on statements. In the example above, the companywould say, in its policy, that “Project managers
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represent the company on permitting team members to access the production server”. The manner in which such a policy
is formally expressed depends on the logic, and we will discuss a few choices in later sections.
In this paper, we argue for an explicit account of permission in a logic for access control. We motivate and develop a logic
that combines saying and permission, using an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf of another. The combination
leads us to a novel account of representation. In the logics of saying, where there is no notion of permission, representation is
accommodated using variants of the hand-off axiom [1]. Abadi [1] pointed out some problematic interactions between the
hand-off axiom and classical reasoning, which we will discuss in detail in Section 2.1. The use of permission provides a way
to avoid these problems. An explicit account of permission leads naturally to an explicit account of obligation, which in turn
leads us to examine legal powers and conformance checking. We now introduce these topics.
Legal power: Representation is a special case of the broader concept of legal power. Hohfeld, in his seminal work, deﬁned
the concept of power as follows [31, p. 44]:
A person (or persons)may be said to have the power to effect a change in legal relations, if the change in legal relations
results from some superadded facts that are under his volitional control.
We decompose this deﬁnition into three components, to give the main intuitions for our approach:
1. The description of power – A principal (A) grants the power of representation to another principal (B) on certain
statements, if A says that B is permitted to issue those statements (on her behalf).
2. The “superadded facts” by which a power is exercised – B exercises the power of representation by issuing statements
on behalf of A.
3. The change in legal relations – If A grants the power of representation to B, and B exercises this power, then we will
infer that the statement issued by B is issued by A as well.
The logical analysis of power has been of interest for several years [18,34,35,36,40]. Our approach is related to two lines of
research. With regard to the description of power (Item 1 above), Lindahl [40, Part II] (see also [34]) suggested that various
notions of power can be distinguished by nesting obligations and permissions with an action modality. Saying is our analog
of the action modality. With regard to the change in legal relations (Item 3 above), Jones and Sergot [35] and Gelati et al. [18]
describe general frameworks to reason about situations where an act by a principal counts as a means to create a state of
affairs within an institution. We consider a restricted scenario where a statement by one principal counts as an identical
statement made by another principal. However, in [18,35], the concept of counts as is taken to be the description of power
itself, and it does not arise via saying. The dependence of power on saying, in our approach, leads us to a novel analysis of
recursive notions of power, e.g., “empowerment to empower”. We discuss the differences in Section 2.2.
Conformance checking: The problems of access control, representation, and power arose for us while extending our prior
work [14] on conformance checking to privacy regulation. We introduce the problem of conformance here, and discuss how
the ideas in [14] relate to this work in Section 2.3. In conformance, one is interested in checking whether the operations of
organizations obey a policy. We are given a policy and a description of an organization’s operations (as a state or trace). An
organization (A) conforms to the policy if we can prove that for all p, if the policy says that A is required or obligated to do p,
then A does p. The design of logics for conformance, notably deontic logic, has been of interest for several years, and we refer
the reader to [33,45] for a broad perspective. In recent years, the focus has been more on tailoring logics for the regulations
at hand, and examples include business contracts [4,19–21,27,38] and health-care regulations [10,14]. Our focus in this work
is on how power interacts with the question of conformance.
Contributions and outline: In this paper, we motivate and design a formalism that combines saying and permission, with
applications to access control and conformance. The combination yields beneﬁts to both applications:
1. For access control, we propose a new decidable axiomatization which accommodates delegation [3,39] and “speaking
for” [2,3,16]. Our approach overcomes the problematic interactions with classical reasoning, pointed out by Abadi [1].
“Speaking for” and delegation are obtained as consequences of an axiom that permits a principal to speak on behalf of
another.
2. For conformance, the proposed axiomatization is used to reason about declarative powers [18], by nesting saying with
obligation and permission.We obtain a novel analysis of recursive notions of power, e.g., “empowerment to empower”.
Conformance, as the satisfaction of obligations, is shown to be decidable.
InSection2,wegiveadetailedmotivationandbackground forourapproach in threeparts. First,weconsider representation
in access control, under which we include delegation [3,39] and “speaking for” [1,3,16]. Second, we discuss examples of
powers, and compare our approach to the counts as frameworks for power [18,35]. And, ﬁnally, we discuss howwe integrate
the work here with our prior work [14].
Section 3 develops a logic in the form of two interacting components. The inference component determines what has been
said, and involves the choice of appropriate axioms [1,3,17].We introduce twoaxioms to characterize the interaction between
saying and permission. The decidability of the resulting logic is established. The saying component is used to create new
utterances. For this component,we extend the formalism in [14],which is a generalized formof logic programming. Themod-
ularizationallowsus touse restricted formsofquantiﬁcationwhilepreservingdecidabilityof access control andconformance.
We also prove a non-interference property which is crucial for the distributed policies that arise in access control.
In Section 4, we discuss our formalism in the context of related work. We consider access control examples, and confor-
mance in the presence of powers. We also identify some interesting lines for further research. Section 5 concludes.
52 N. Dinesh et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 80 (2011) 50–74
2. Permission to speak
In this section, wemotivate the explicit use of saying and permission in a formal language for policy. Section 2.1 considers
the problem of representation in access control, under which we include delegation [3,39] and “speaking for” [1,3,16]. In
Section 2.2, we discuss examples of powers conveyed by nested permissions. We compare and contrast our approach with
the counts as approaches to power. Finally, we discuss how we integrate the work here with our prior work [14], to clarify
some methodological decisions (Section 2.3).
2.1. Representation in access control
While there are a wide variety of access control logics, one commonality that stands out is a notion of saying [1]. We can
express the fact that a principal makes a statement. We use saysl(A)ϕ to denote that principal A says ϕ in the set of laws l(A).
Informally, a law is understood as a single statement in the policy of a principal, e.g., a hospital says “Alice is permitted to
access her health information”, in its policy. And, the interpretation of a set of laws is the conjunction of the individual laws.
These intuitions are formalized in Section 3. Our approach differs from others in that we associate statements to a principal
via a set of laws (saysl(A)ϕ) rather than directly with the principal (saysAϕ). This indirection lets us use saying to reason about
exceptions to laws, as in [14], and we will discuss an example in Section 3.3.
All access control logics give a principal the ability to let another principal make statements on her behalf. As an example
(based on [16]), consider a ﬁle access scenario, where an administrator (A) has control the operation of deleting ﬁles shared
by groups of principals. When there are many shared ﬁles in the system, A cannot personally handle all requests. Suppose
that the administrator authorizes the leader of a group (B) to decide when a particular ﬁle is to be deleted (del). In this
scenario, we say that B represents A on del, and we wish to conclude that if saysl(B)(del), then saysl(A)(del).
How do we accommodate this inference? A naive approach is to introduce “saysl(B)(del) ⇒ saysl(A)(del)” into A’s policy
(where ⇒ is the implication connective of the underlying logic). However, such statements create an access control risk,
because “saysl(B)(del) ⇒ saysl(A)(del)” could be introduced by B, thereby giving B the ability to decide whether any ﬁle is to
be deleted.
To address this security risk, a principal A is only allowed to introduce statements of the form saysl(A)ψ . Additional
machinery (usually an axiom) is needed to accommodate representation. Abadi [1] discusses several alternatives, involving
variants of the hand-off axiom:
• saysl(A)(φ ⇒ saysl(A)ψ) ⇒ (φ ⇒ saysl(A)ψ).
B represents A on del is expressed as:
• saysl(A)(saysl(B)(del) ⇒ saysl(A)(del)).
The hand-off axiom lets us conclude that saysl(B)(del) ⇒ saysl(A)(del). However, the hand-off axiom has displeasing
consequences in classical logics. For example, saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ (¬ϕ ⇒ saysl(B)ψ) (for all ψ) is provable [1], i.e., if a statement
by B fails, then B gives access to all the actions that she controls. The solution to this problem has been to move to an
intuitionistic setting, as in [2,16,17].
We suggest that the problem is not with classical reasoning, but with the hand-off axiom. The key idea is to reformulate
the axiom using the interaction between saying and permission. We now introduce the reformulated version of the axiom,
followed by a discussion of its beneﬁts.
Wesay thatB representsAondel, ifA says thatB ispermitted to saydel.More formally, thestatementsaysl(A)(PB(saysl(B)del))
is added to A’s policy, where PB(saysl(B)del) is read as “B is permitted to say del”. The following are equivalent versions of the
axiom of representation:
• If A says that B is permitted to say ϕ, then if B says ϕ, A says ϕ.
• saysl(A)(PB(saysl(B)ϕ)) ⇒ (saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ).
The axiom of representation is intended for a particular sense of speaking/saying, i.e., speaking on someone’s behalf. This
sense of saying is the usual one in access control. To simplify matters, we do not explicitly represent the principal on behalf
of whom a statement is being made.
“Speaking for” [2,3,16] is a case of representation when one principal represents another on all statements. If B speaks
for A, we wish to conclude saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ for all ϕ. “Speaking for” has a compelling deﬁnition in our approach. We say
that B speaks for A if A permits B to say anything (⊥) on her behalf, i.e., saysl(A)PB(saysl(B)⊥).
A novelty in our approach is that “speaking for” and hand-off are both obtained as a consequence of the axiom of
representation. In [2,3,16], “speaking for” and hand-off are not related, i.e., the former involves an algebra over principals
or second-order quantiﬁcation, and the latter is obtained using an axiom (which implies hand-off). This suggests that the
representation axiom is quite different from the hand-off axiom. It is tempting to relate the representation axiom to a
restricted version of hand-off:
• saysl(A)(saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ) ⇒ (saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ).
However, even for this restricted case, we do not know of a complete semantics for hand-off, which makes it difﬁcult to
show that a statement is not provable (Abadi et al. [3] observe similar difﬁculties). We believe that the representation axiom
is a persuasive alternative to hand-off, because it yields a decidable logic with a complete semantics, and more importantly,
it has an intuitive interpretation.
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A restricted version of the axiom of representation has been proposed by Becker et al. [7], in the context of the autho-
rization language SECPal. In SECPal, representation is restricted to atomic predicates, and hence, “speaking for” cannot be
accommodated. Moreover, the relationship between permission and obligation is not explored. Our formalism generalizes
SECPal, to accommodate both “speaking for” and obligation. We now discuss further motivation for our approach.
2.2. Powers and nested constructions
In this section, we consider examples of powers that arise via nested obligations and permissions. We compare and
contrast our approach to the counts as approaches to power [18,35]. The comparison is intended to illustrate the interplay
between power and saying. We then discuss an example where our approach offers only a limited analysis.
We begin by discussing our approach to nested permissions. Consider the following statement: “A hospital (H) permits a
patient (A) to permit her mother (B) to access her information”. We will rephrase the permission as follows: H says that A is
permitted to say that B is permitted to access her information. Formally, this is expressed as: saysl(H)(PA(saysl(A)(PBaccess))).
If A does indeed permit access to her mother (saysl(A)(PBaccess)), we will conclude saysl(H)(PBaccess) using the axiom of
representation, i.e., H permits access to B. As a result, nested permissions are related to representation, i.e., “H permits A to
permit B to do ϕ” iff “A represents H in permitting B to do ϕ”.
We now turn to the analysis by Gelati et al. [18]. To simplify presentation, we describe their approach using the notation
that we have already introduced. In [18], declarative power, which includes representation, is deﬁned formally in terms of a
counts as operator/connective:
(P1) DPHA (ϕ) = CountsAs(saysl(A)ϕ, saysl(H)ϕ).
DPH
A
(ϕ) is read as “H grants A the power to declare ϕ on its behalf”. And, CountsAs(saysl(A)ϕ, saysl(H)ϕ) is read as “A saying ϕ
counts as B saying ϕ”. The logic of counts as [18,35] has broad applicability, and a detailed exposition is well beyond the scope
of this paper. For present purposes, it sufﬁces to note that a version of the following is provable:
(P2)  CountsAs(saysl(A)ϕ, saysl(H)ϕ) ⇒ (saysl(A)ϕ ⇒ saysl(H)ϕ).
 φ is read as “φ is provable”, i.e., φ is a theorem of the language. The key observation here is that power (conveyed by counts
as) can result in the creation of statements, using (P2). However, the converse is not true. Let us return to the example of
nested permissions see why this is important. Using (P1) and (P2), we can show that:
(P3)  DPHA (PBaccess) ⇒ (saysl(A)(PBaccess) ⇒ saysl(H)(PBaccess)).
And, (P3) plays the role of the representation axiom. As a result, our approach is quite similar to that of Gelati et al. [18],
when there is one level of nesting. However, differences arise when we consider one more level of nesting.
Suppose H says that A is empowered to empower B to permit C to access her information. Note that empowerment can be
paraphrased as permission to say in our approach, and the analysis would proceed analogously to the previous case. Gelati et
al. [18] express this empowerment to empower as: DPHA (DP
H
B (PCaccess)). Let ϕ = PCaccess. Using (P1) and (P2), we obtain:
(P4)  DPHA (DPHB (ϕ)) ⇒ (saysl(A)(DPHB (ϕ)) ⇒ saysl(H)(DPHB (ϕ))).
GivenDPHA (DP
H
B (ϕ)), ifA exercises this powerby empoweringB to declareϕ,wewill conclude, using (P3), that saysl(H)(DP
H
B (ϕ)),
i.e., H says that B is empowered to declare ϕ. However, the following is not provable:
(P5)  saysl(H)(DPHB (ϕ)) ⇒ (saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ saysl(H)ϕ).
Thus, B cannot exercise the power in the same way as A, due to the difference between (P3) and (P5). This asymmetry,
between primary and recursive powers, arises because the counts as operator is taken to be the description of power itself,
and it does not arise via saying (or some other action).1 The dependence of power on saying, in our approach, leads to an
analogous treatment of primary and recursive powers.
Finally, we consider an example of nested obligations to illustrate a scenario where our approach gives only a limited
analysis. We adopt the deﬁnition of obligation as the dual of permission, i.e.,PAϕ = ¬OA¬ϕ (OAϕ is read as ϕ is obligatory for
A). Consider the following statement: “A says that B is required to forbid her child (C) fromplaying near the road (play)”. Aswe
didwith the nested permissions, we paraphrase it as “A says that B should say that C is forbidden fromplaying near the road”.
Formally, this is expressed as: saysl(A)OBsaysl(B)OC¬play. If B imposes this requirement by saying so (saysl(B)OC¬play), we
will conclude that B has fulﬁlled her obligation toward A, i.e., B conformsw.r.t. A. Does this capture the intent of the statement?
Consider an alternate paraphrase of the statement: “A says that B is required to see to it that C does not play”. And, it may
require a stronger action of B, e.g., physically preventing C from playing near the road. The analysis of such requirements is
beyond the scope of this work. The action modalities in the logics of power [18,34,35,40] offer a good solution.
2.3. Exceptions and does not say
Theproblemof exceptions to lawshasbeen studiedextensively for several years [5,44,51], and is related to thebroader area
of non-monotonic reasoning [41,46,47,49]. In [14], building on Reiter’s Default Logic [49] and Kripke’s theory of truth [37],
we expressed laws using labeled conditional statements of the form:
(id) ϕ → ψ
1 More precisely, power needs to be linked to an institutional action, which is not effective. An effective action modality () is one which accommodates
 (ϕ) ⇒ ϕ, and would be unsuitable for access control.
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Fig. 1. Interaction between the components of the logic.
Our informal interpretation of such statements was “If ϕ is true, then the regulator says ψ via the law labeled (id)”, where
“id” is an identiﬁer for the law. This interpretation of rules has the ﬂavor of the counts as connective [18,35], i.e., ϕ counts as
a statement of ψ from the regulator. Now, we can consider statements of the form:
(id1) The regulator does not say ψ via the law labeled (id) → ψ ′
In other words, “If the regulator does not say ψ via the law labeled (id), then the regulator says ψ ′ via the law labeled (id1)”.
Does not say is useful in expressing exceptions to laws, and the law labeled (id) would serve as an exception to the law labeled
(id1). We discuss examples in Section 3.3.
Exceptionsmake regulations non-monotonic, in the sense that adding a newexceptionwould prevent certain conclusions
that were drawn before. There are also well-established reinterpretations of non-monotonic logics asmodal logics, and here,
we refer the reader to some classic works on autoepistemic logic [28,46]. Given these connections, an important question
that arises is whether the underlying logic for saying should be non-monotonic. The approach we take in this work is to
start with a monotonic logic with saying, obligation, and permission (Section 3.2), and then integrate it into a non-monotonic
framework (Section 3.3). The idea is that the non-monotonic component resolves exceptions, giving us a consistent set of
statements on which to base access control and conformance decisions. This aspect of our approach was motivated purely
by methodological convenience, and sufﬁced for the regulations at hand. A proper non-monotonic treatment of nested
modalities is a challenging problem (see [28]), and we leave an investigation to future work.
3. A logic for access control and conformance
In this section, we develop a logic in the form of two interacting components – (a) the inference component, which
involves the choice of appropriate axioms, and (b) the saying component, which is used to represent policies. Fig. 1 shows the
interaction between the components of the access control system. There are two kinds of actions of interest – (1) operational
acts, e.g., downloading a song, and (2) speech acts. The operational acts are described using a state, which contains the
interpretation of predicates, and the speech acts are described using laws.
A principal speaks by introducing laws. In Fig. 1, the principals A and B introduce the laws 1 and 2 respectively. The laws
are evaluated using the axioms to produce a set of utterances, i.e., what the principals say via their laws. A set of laws can be
thought of as a logic program, and utterances as the extensions that result from the program (via a ﬁxed point computation).
Once we have the utterances, there are several decision problems of interest. The access control problem is to decide whether
a request is permitted by the set of utterances. The conformance problem is to decide whether operational and speech acts
satisfy the obligations imposed by the utterances, and if they do not, violations are reported.
In Section 3.1, we introduce an example from privacy regulation, which we will use to illustrate the various deﬁnitions.
Section 3.2 is an overview of the inference component. We describe (axiomatically) a logic with two modalities – saying
and obligation. In Section 3.3, we adapt the formalism in [14] for the saying component. We extend [14] in two ways. First,
we prove a non-interference property which is crucial for the distributed policies that arise in access control (Section 3.4).
Second, we show that conformance, in the presence of nested obligations and permissions, is decidable (Section 3.5).
3.1. Example
We will use an example from the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (cf. [10]), to illustrate the
various deﬁnitions. HIPAA regulates the uses and disclosures of patient health information, and provides a natural test bed
for investigating both access control and conformance. The following example is intended to illustrate several subtleties
involved in reasoning about rights:
(1) A patient has the right to view his records that are maintained in a designated record set, except for:
a. Psychotherapy notes.
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b. Records compiled for a legal proceeding.
c. …
There are three (types of) principals associated with this right:
• The regulatory authority behind HIPAA, which enforces the right.
• Patients, who can exercise the right, and
• Principals who maintain records of the patient, and have to conform to the right.
Section 3.2 is concerned with how to formally express the phrase “has the right”. In Section 3.3, we deal with the exceptions.
Sections 3.4 and 3.5 consider the access control and conformance aspects.
3.2. The inference component – axioms
In this section, we develop a predicate logic with two modalities saying and obligation. We allow formulas with free
variables, but no quantiﬁer over objects. The quantiﬁcation over objects is carried out in the process of saying (Section 3.3),
which uses provability in the propositional subset of the language deﬁned here. We begin by deﬁning the syntax:
Deﬁnition 1 (Syntax). Given sets1, . . . ,n (of predicate names), countable sets of object namesO, principal namesOP ⊆ O,
variables X , variables for principals XP ⊆ X , identiﬁers ID, and a function l : OP → 2ID, the language L(1, . . . ,n, O, OP , X, XP ,
l, ID), abbreviated as L, is deﬁned as follows:
ϕy ::= α | ϕy ∧ ϕy | ¬ϕy | saysIdyψ
ψy ::= ϕy | ψy ∧ ψy | ¬ψy | Oyϕy
ϕ ::= ϕy (for all y ∈ XP ∪ OP) | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ
ψ ::= ψy (for all y ∈ XP ∪ OP) | ψ ∧ ψ | ¬ψ
where, y ∈ XP ∪ OP , and α generates atomic predicates of the form p(z1, . . . , zj) with p ∈ j and (z1, . . . , zj) ∈ (X ∪ O)j . In
addition, ∅ ⊂ Idy ⊆ l(y) if y ∈ OP and Idy = l(y) otherwise (y ∈ XP).We assume that for all distinct A, B ∈ OP , l(A) ∩ l(B) = ∅ and
l(A) = ∅, i.e., the assigned identiﬁers are disjoint, and non-empty.
The set of formulas generated by each BNF rule are referred to as Lϕy , Lϕ , Lψy and Lψ respectively, and L = Lϕ ∪ Lψ .
Disjunction ϕ ∨ ψ = ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) and implication ϕ ⇒ ψ = ¬ϕ ∨ ψ are derived connectives.
There is a set of object names O with a distinguished set OP ⊆ O called principals. Principals include individual persons,
such as patients and doctors, and institutions, such as hospitals and regulatory authorities. We use upper case letters for
principals, e.g., A, B. Other named objects (O − OP) include entities with no associated notion of agency, e.g., medical records
and songs. We use lower case letters for these objects, except for the letters {x, y, z} which are reserved for variables. It is
useful to divide the objects in O − OP further into sorts, but we avoid it to simplify notation. Variables are divided into two
sorts as well, i.e., all variables X , and variables for principals XP . In a slight abuse of notation, we will use the symbols for
variables, i.e., x, y and z, to stand for a generic element in X ∪ O or XP ∪ OP .
Oyϕ is read as “ϕ is obligatory for the principal y”. Permission is deﬁned as the dual of obligation, i.e., Pyϕ = ¬Oy¬ϕ.
The saying operator is understood as follows. Principals speak by introducing identiﬁed laws, as shown in Fig. 1. The
function l assigns non-empty and disjoint sets of identiﬁers to each principal, and for example, l(A) denotes the set of
identiﬁers for laws introduced by the principal A ∈ OP . saysIdyϕ is read as “y says ψ via the laws Idy”. In the case where
Idy = l(y), saysl(y)ψ is read as “y says ψ via her laws”, or brieﬂy “y says ψ”.
We give some examples to clarify the notation for identiﬁers. Given A ∈ OP , let l(A) = {1,2}. The formulas saysl(A)ϕ and
says{1,2}ϕ are identical. Inmany examples, wewill have need only for the notation saysl(A)ϕ.2 Speciﬁc identiﬁers (e.g., says{1}ϕ)
will be used to accommodate exceptions to laws (Section 3.3). Exceptions are often conveyed by phrases such as “except as
speciﬁed in Section 120 of HIPAA” [10,14], and a subset of identifers would correspond to the laws in “Section 120 of HIPAA”.
Given a variable over principals x ∈ XP , we will only use the notation saysl(x)ϕ. This is useful, for example, to grant powers to
a class of principals, e.g., patients of a hospital.
We now mention a peculiarity of Deﬁnition 1. The BNF rules ensure the alternation of obligation and saying modalities,
e.g.,Oysaysl(y)Ozϕ ∈ L, butOyOzϕ ∈ L. Following vonWright [53], we understand obligations as applying to actions and their
consequences. The language Lϕy (obtained from the ﬁrst BNF rule) is used to describe actions of a principal y – (a) atomic
actions, (b) combinations of actions (using connectives), or (c) saying, which is (a consequence of) a speech act. An obligation
is an opinion, which is created via a speech act, but is not an act by itself. These restrictions are similar in spirit to the logics
of power [18,34,35,40].
The statements in Lwill be used in the inference component of access control, i.e., to determinewhat has been said. In other
words, we will be given a set of utterances U and a question ψ , and we need to determine whether ψ is provable from U. We
2 The assumptions about assignment of identiﬁers are purely (and hopefully) for clarity. We do not consider obligations, permissions, and statements
associated with groups of individuals in this work, and shared identiﬁers may be useful here. We believe that these can be straightforwardly added to the
present framework.
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Fig. 2. Axiomatization of the propositional fragment of L. The set of modalitiesQ consists of saysIdAϕ andOA(ϕ) (for all A ∈ O and IdA ⊆ l(A)).
focus on provability for the propositional subset of L, i.e., without variables. The propositional subset of L has the modalities
saysIdAϕ and OA(ϕ) (for all A ∈ O and IdA ⊆ l(A)).
We adopt the axiomatization in Fig. 2. A1 and R1 give us propositional reasoning. A2 and R2 are common to both saying
and obligation. A3 and A4 are speciﬁc to saying and obligation respectively. Finally, A5 and A6 describe the interaction
between the two modalities.
The notion of provability is of crucial interest. We say that ϕ is provable (denoted  ϕ), if ϕ is an instance of the axioms
A1–A6 or follows from the axioms using the rules R1 and R2. Given a ﬁnite set of formulas , we say that ϕ is provable from
, denoted   ϕ, if  (∧) ⇒ ϕ.
We mention some provable statements that we will use in the example from HIPAA (Section 3.2.2):
Proposition 1. The following are provable:
1.  saysl(A)(OBsaysl(B)ϕ) ⇒ (saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ).
2.  saysl(A)(OAsaysl(A)ϕ) ⇒ saysl(A)ϕ.
3.  saysl(A)(PBsaysl(B)⊥) ⇒ (saysl(B)ϕ ⇒ says(A)ϕ).
The proofs are easy and we leave the details to the reader. Items 1 and 2 show that versions of axioms A5 and A6 hold for
obligation. Item 3 gives us speaking for, i.e., B speaks for A, as we discussed in Section 2.1.
The rest of the section is organized as follows.We begin in Section 3.2.1 by discussing the various axioms in the context of
related work. Section 3.2.2 considers the example from HIPAA, and the various subtleties involved in reasoning about rights.
We then present a complete Kripke semantics for the axioms (Section 3.2.3), and use it to show that provability is decidable
(Section 3.2.4).
3.2.1. Discussion of axioms
We now discuss the axioms. The axioms A1 and A2, together with the rules R1 and R2, gives us the modal logic K. The K
axiomatization was used by Abadi et al. [3] as a basis for all (classical) access control logics. From A3, it follows that if A says
ϕ via the laws (IdA), then ϕ also holds w.r.t. a larger set of laws issued by A (Id
′
A
). In Section 3.3, when evaluating regulations,
we will obtain a statement of the form says{idA}ϕ from each law of A. And, A3 can be informally understood as amonotonicity
condition, i.e., if ϕ is a consequence of what is said via an individual law, then ϕ is said via all sets of laws that include it. At
a ﬁrst glance, A3 is at odds with the fact that regulations are non-monotonic. However, as shown in Fig. 1, we are interested
in reasoning about utterances, which are obtained from the laws after all exceptions have been resolved. If the law changes,
then the utterances will have to be recomputed.
The K axiomatization, together with A4, gives us the modal logic KD. This axiomatization is common to many systems,
giving it thenameStandardDeontic Logic (SDL) (c.f. [33]).Wenote thatSDL isavery simplistic systemofobligation, andseveral
objections can be raised. The most serious objection is that SDL does not cope with contrary-to-duty (CTD) obligations (see,
e.g., [22,42,48]). A CTD obligation is one that arises when another has been violated. This is useful, for example, in business
contracts to describe mitigating actions [20,21,27,38], e.g., “paying a ﬁne”, upon failure to deliver goods. We do not address
CTD structures in this work, as they are not as prevalent in privacy regulation as they are in contracts. Governatori and
Rotolo [22] propose that CTDs are not a problemwith obligations per se, but can be understood as a special kind of exception.
We agree entirely with their perspective. However, accommodating these kinds of exceptions involves the introduction of a
preference operator, and we leave this to future work.
Aswediscussed in Section2.1,A5 is needed to accommodatenotions of representation in access control. The self-respecting
axiom, A6, is read as “If A permits herself to say ϕ, then A says ϕ”. We discuss the use of A6 in the example from HIPAA.
3.2.2. Example
We consider the example from HIPAA, introduced in Section 3.1. In this section, our focus is on the utterances obtained
from the laws of the various principals.
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Let H stand for (the regulator who wrote) HIPAA. And, let Alice (A) be a patient whose records (r) are maintained by an
insurance company run by Bob (B). Let us assume further that A has the right to access her records. The utterance obtained
from H’s laws would be:
(u1) saysl(H)PAsaysl(A)OBsaysl(B)PAaccess(A, r).
The direct reading of (u1) in English is unwieldy, i.e., we get “H says that A is permitted to say that B is required to
say that A is permitted to access her records”. A better reading is obtained by eliding all occurrences of says that ap-
pear immediately above an obligation or permission, except for the outermost one. Applying this ellipsis to (u1), we get:
saysl(H)PA . . .OB . . .PAaccess(A, r), which is read as: “HIPAA says that Alice is permitted to require Bob to permit her to access
her records”. We will use such readings henceforth.
Theword rightdoesnothave aunique translation into logic.Hohfeld [31] pointedout that theword right is used indifferent
senses, and depending on the context, it can entail a permission, claim, or power.3 The formulation in (u1) corresponds to the
power interpretation. As we mentioned in Section 1, our descriptions of powers follows the suggestion of Lindahl [40, Part
II] (see also [34]), in terms of nesting obligations and permissions with an action modality.
How does Alice exercise this right? In our approach, rights are exercised by the introduction of a law. The speciﬁc mechanism
for introducing such laws is application dependent. For example, if Alice sends an email to Bob requiring him to grant her
access, then this may count as Alice exercising her right (see [18,35]). Alice’s attempt to exercise her right would result in the
following utterance:
(u2) saysl(A)OBsaysl(B)PAaccess(A, r).
In other words, Alice says that Bob is required to permit her to access her records.
How does Bob comply with this right? In our approach, this happens via Bob’s access control policy. Suppose Bob wants to
permit a patient to access their records only if HIPAA requires it. Bob’s policy is represented as follows:
(u3) saysl(B)PHsaysl(H)OBsaysl(B)PAaccess(A, r).
In other words, Bob permits HIPAA to require him to permit Alice to view her records. Note that Bob has no regard for Alice’s
requirement to see her records, but only what HIPAA says.
Let consist of the utterances (u1), (u2), and (u3) above. Since Alice is attempting to view her records, the access control
system tries to prove that saysl(B)PAaccess(A, r) from . The derivation proceeds as follows:
(d1)   saysl(H)OBsaysl(B)PAaccess(A, r) (from (u1) and (u2) using A5).
(d2)   saysl(B)OBsaysl(B)PAaccess(A, r) (from (u3) and (d1) using Proposition 1 item 1).
(d3)   saysl(B)PAaccess(A, r) (from (d2) using Proposition 1 item 2).
Step (d1) is understood as HIPAA enforcing Alice’s right, i.e., HIPAA requires Bob to permit Alice to view her records. In step
(d2), Bob acknowledgesHIPAA’s authority by requiring himself to permit Alice to viewher records. Step (d3) shows the utility
of A6, i.e., by forcing Bob to say what he requires himself to say. Due to (d3), Alice is indeed permitted to view her records!
In Section 3.5, we will show how blame can be assigned to Bob if he fails to introduce (d3) or something that implies it.
In summary, to reason about a right, we had to use utterances from the enforcer (HIPAA), the person exercising the right
(Alice), and the person complying with it (Bob). The precisemanner in which Alice’s utterance is obtained is left unspeciﬁed.
In assessing violations of rights, the issue in question is often whether the right was exercised. For example, Bob may claim
that Alice did not request to see her records. We do not believe that this is a problem for logic, but it is a problem in
implementing a system that allows principals to exercise their rights. However, we do believe that the logic provides a good
intuition for the inferences involved, given the appropriate utterances.
The reasoning involved in this example is outside the scope of prior access control logics [1–3,11,16,17,39], because
obligation is not accommodated. We believe that the reasoning can be accommodated by the counts as frameworks for
power [18,35], but as discussed in Section 2.2, some reformulation is needed.
3.2.3. Semantics, soundness, and completeness
In this section,weprovide aKripke semantics forwhich the axiomatization is soundandcomplete. Semantic completeness
is used mainly as a tool, for example, to show that a statement is not provable. Identifying a compelling semantics for says
is an important open problem in access control logics (see [1]), and we do not address it in this work.4 We begin by deﬁning
models (Kripke structures):
Deﬁnition 2 (Models). Given countable sets of object names O, principal names OP ⊆ O, 1, . . . ,n (where j is a set of
predicate names of arity j), identiﬁers for rules ID, and l : OP → 2ID, a model M(O,OP,1, . . . ,n, ID, l), abbreviated as M, is
the tuple (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO) where:
• S is a set of states.
• Ij : j × S → 2O
j
is the interpretation of predicates of arity j. Given p ∈ j , we will say that p(o1, . . . , oj) is true at state s
iff (o1, . . . , oj) ∈ Ij (p, s).
3 Hohfeld [31] describes a claim as the correlative of obligation, i.e., when a claim is invaded an obligation is violated. For example, a patient has a claim
that hospitals notify her of disclosures of her health information. And, the claim is equivalent to an obligation on the hospital to notify her.
4 We speculate that a good semantics for says has to come from an application other than access control and conformance. In these applications, saying
arises via policies, which are expressed using formulas. There does not seem to be a corresponding computational interpretation.
58 N. Dinesh et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 80 (2011) 50–74
• δL : S × 2ID → 2S . δL(s, Id) corresponds to a description of s according to the laws labeled with identiﬁers in Id (taken
conjunctively).
• δO : S × OP → 2S . δO(s, A) corresponds to an idealization of s, for which the principal A is held responsible.
For the axioms A3–A6we need the following constraints C3–C6 (resply.). For all s ∈ S:
C3 δL(s, IdA) ⊇ δL(s, Id′A) for all A ∈ OP and IdA ⊆ Id′A ⊆ l(A).
C4 δO(s, A) = ∅ for all A ∈ OP .
C5 For all {A, B} ⊆ OP , IdA ⊆ l(A), IdB ⊆ l(B), and s′ ∈ δL(s, IdA):
(a) s′ ∈ δL(s, IdB), or
(b) There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, B), s′ ∈ δL(s2, IdB).
C6 For all A ∈ OP , IdA ⊆ l(A), and s′ ∈ δL(s, IdA):
There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, A), s′ ∈ δL(s2, IdA).
C5 and C6 can be understood in the context of soundness (Lemma 1). Given the object names O, OP ⊆ O, predicate names
(1, . . . ,n), identiﬁers ID, and the function l, the space of models is denoted byM(O,OP 1, . . . ,n, ID, l), abbreviated asM.
We can now deﬁne satisfaction and validity, and we restrict attention to the propositional fragment of L:
Deﬁnition 3 (Semantics). Given a model M = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO), s ∈ S and a propositional ϕ ∈ L, the relation (M, s) |= ϕ
is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• (M, s) |= p(o1, . . . , oj) iff (o1, . . . , oj) ∈ Ij (p, s).
• The semantics of conjunction and negation is deﬁned in the usual way.
• (M, s) |= saysIdAϕ iff (M, s′) |= ϕ, for all s′ ∈ δL(s, IdA).• (M, s |= OAϕ iff (M, s′) |= ϕ, for all s′ ∈ δO(s′, A).
We can now deﬁne validity:
• ϕ is valid in a modelM (M |= ϕ) iff for all s ∈ S, (M, s) |= ϕ.
• ϕ is valid (|= ϕ) iff for allM ∈ M,M |= ϕ.
Theorem 1 (Soundness and completeness). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L,  ϕ iff |= ϕ.
Lemma 1 (Soundness). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, if  ϕ, then |= ϕ.
Proof. We need to show that the axioms are valid, and that the rules preserve validity. It is well-known that the axioms A1
and A2 are valid, and that R1 and R2 preserve validity in all Kripke structures. The validity of A3 and A4 can easily be shown
using C3 and C4. We discuss the case for A5.
Suppose A5 is not valid. There existsM, s, ϕ, A, B, IdA and IdB such that:
• (M, s) |= saysIdA (PBsaysIdBϕ).• (M, s) |= saysIdBϕ, and• (M, s) |= saysIdAϕ.
Since (M, s) |= saysIdAϕ, there exists s′ ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that (M, s′) |= ϕ. Since C5 holds, there are two cases to consider:
1. If s′ ∈ δL(s, IdB), then (M, s) |= saysIdBϕ giving us a contradiction.
2. If there exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, B), s′ ∈ δL(s2, IdB), then:
• (M, s1) |= OB¬saysIdBϕ.• (M, s) |= saysIdA (¬OB¬saysIdBϕ).
Hence, (M, s) |= saysIdA (PBsaysIdBϕ) (since PBϕ = ¬OB¬ϕ), giving us a contradiction.
Hence, A5 is valid. The proof for A6 is similar. 
Lemma 2 (Completeness). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, if |= ϕ, then  ϕ.
The rest of this section gives the proof. We will use a canonical model argument (c.f. [29]). We show the contrapositive,
i.e., if  ϕ, then |= ϕ. In other words, if  ϕ then there existM and s such that (M, s) |= ¬ϕ. We begin with some terminology.
We say that ϕ is consistent if ¬ϕ is not provable ( ¬ϕ). A ﬁnite set of formulas {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn} is consistent if ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn is
consistent. An inﬁnite set of formulas is consistent if every ﬁnite subset is consistent. A set of formulas ismaximal consistent
if for all ϕ ∈ L − ,  ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent. The following are properties of maximal consistent sets:
Proposition 2. Given a maximal consistent set :
1. For all ϕ ∈ L, exactly one of ϕ ∈  or ¬ϕ ∈ .
2. If  ϕ ⇒ ψ and ϕ ∈ , then ψ ∈ .
3. If  ϕ, then ϕ ∈  andQϕ ∈  (for all modalitiesQ).
The proof is straightforward. We now deﬁne the canonical model, in which every consistent formula is true at some state:
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Deﬁnition 4 (Canonical model). The canonical modelM = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO) is such that:
• S is the set of all maximal consistent sets.
• (o1, . . . , oj) ∈ Ij (p,) iff p(o1, . . . , oj) ∈ .
• ′ ∈ δL(, IdA) iff for all ϕ, if saysIdAϕ ∈ , then ϕ ∈ ′.• ′ ∈ δO(, A) iff for all ϕ, if OAϕ ∈ , then ϕ ∈ ′.
We now show that the canonical model satisﬁes the frame constraints:
Proposition 3. The canonical model satisﬁes the frame constraints C3–C6.
Proof. The proof that C3 and C4 hold are left to the reader. We discuss the case for C5. Given the canonical model M =
(S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO),  ∈ S, and suppose for the purpose of contradiction that there exists ′ ∈ δL(, IdA) such that:
• ′ ∈ δL(, IdB). By construction, there exists saysIdBψ ∈  such that ¬ψ ∈ ′.• For all1 ∈ δL(, IdA), there exists2 ∈ δO(1, B),′ ∈ δL(2, IdB). By Proposition 4 (below), there exists saysIdAPBsaysIdB
ϕ ∈  such that ¬ϕ ∈ ′.
Using Proposition 2, saysIdB (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈  and saysIdAPBsaysIdB (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ . So, saysIdA (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ , and hence ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ ′.
That is ϕ ∈ ′ or ψ ∈ ′, which contradicts the fact that ¬ϕ ∈ ′ and ¬ψ ∈ ′. The proof of C6 is similar. 
Proposition 4. Given the canonical model M = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO), for all  ∈ S, {A, B} ⊆ OP, IdA ⊆ l(A), IdB ⊆ l(B), and ′ ∈
δL(, IdA):
• If for all 1 ∈ δL(, IdA), there exists 2 ∈ δO(1, B), ′ ∈ δL(2, IdB), then there exists saysIdAPBsaysIdB ϕ ∈  and ¬ϕ ∈ ′.
Proof. Fix , A, B, IdA, IdB and 
′ ∈ δL(, IdA). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose for all ϕ ∈ L, if saysIdAPBsaysIdBϕ ∈ ,
then ϕ ∈ ′. Let F be the smallest set such that:
• If saysIdAϕ ∈ , then ϕ ∈ F , and• If ¬ψ ∈ ′, then OB¬saysIdBψ ∈ F .
We claim that F is consistent.5 Suppose not:
(1) There exists {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,OB¬saysIdBψ1, . . . ,OB¬saysIdBψm} ⊆ F such that: ¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ∧ OB¬saysIdBψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ OB¬saysIdBψm).
(2)  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ⇒ PBsaysIdB (ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm) (from (1) using A1, A4, R1 and R2).
(3)  saysIdA (ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ⇒ PBsaysIdB (ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm)) ∈  (from (2) using R2).
(4) By construction, saysIdAϕi ∈  for all 1 i  n. So, using A2 and (3), we can derive that saysIdAPBsaysIdB (ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm) ∈
. As a result, ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm ∈ ′, and there exists ψi ∈ ′ where 1 i  m.
(5) By construction, ¬ψi ∈ ′ for all 1 i  m, which together with (4) contradicts the consistency of ′.
We can extend F into a maximal consistent set 1 such that 1 ∈ δL(, IdA). PBsaysIdBϕ ∈ 1 iff ϕ ∈ ′. So, for all 2 ∈
δO(1, B), if saysIdBϕ ∈ 2, then ϕ ∈ ′. This sufﬁces to conclude that ′ ∈ δL(2, IdB) for all 2 ∈ δO(1, B), giving us a
contradiction. 
The completeness proof is now ﬁnished in the usual way (see, for example, [29]). Given the canonical modelM and a state
, it is easy to show that for all ϕ ∈ L, (M,) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ . Furthermore, given a consistent ϕ, we can construct a maximal
consistent set  such that ϕ ∈ . As a result, for every consistent ϕ, there exists a state  in the canonical model such that
(M,) |= ϕ. Hence, if  ϕ, then |= ϕ. We observe that compactness follows as a corollary of the existence of the canonical
model:
Corollary 1 (Compactness). An inﬁnite set of formulas is satisﬁable iff every ﬁnite subset is satisﬁable.
Given an inﬁnite set of formulas, if every ﬁnite subset is satisﬁable, then by soundness, every ﬁnite subset of is consistent.
And, by deﬁnition,  is consistent. We can extend  into a maximal consistent set, corresponding to a state in the canonical
model.
3.2.4. Decidability
In this section, we adapt the completeness proof to show the bounded-model property, i.e., if φ is satisﬁable, then it is
satisﬁable in a model of bounded size (exponential in the size of φ). We begin by deﬁning the set of subformulas:
Deﬁnition 5 (Subformulas). Given a propositional φ ∈ L, the set of subformulas sub(φ) is the smallest set such that:
1. φ ∈ sub(φ).
2. If ϕ ∈ sub(φ), then ¬ϕ ∈ sub(φ) (¬¬ϕ is identiﬁed with ϕ).
5 Note that if there exists ϕ such that   saysIdAϕ and   saysIdA¬ϕ, then δL(, IdA) = ∅, and C5 and C6 are vacuously satisﬁed. In Proposition 4 (and
Proposition 6 in Section 3.2.4), the contradiction applies only to cases where there exists ′ ∈ δL(, IdA), and hence, no such ϕ exists.
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3. If ϕ ∧ ψ ∈ sub(φ), then ϕ ∈ sub(φ) and ψ ∈ sub(φ).
4. If OAψ ∈ sub(φ) or saysIdAψ ∈ sub(φ), then ψ ∈ sub(φ).
5. If saysIdAψ1 ∈ sub(φ) and saysId′Aψ2 ∈ sub(φ) such that IdA ⊆ l(A) and Id
′
A
⊆ l(A), then saysIdA∪Id′Aψ1 ∈ sub(φ).
6. If saysIdA (
∨
1) ∈ sub(φ) and saysIdB (
∨
2) ∈ sub(φ), then
saysIdA (
∨
2) ∈ sub(φ) and saysIdA (
∨
(1 ∪ 2)) ∈ sub(φ).
7. If saysIdAψ1 ∈ sub(φ) and IdA ⊆ l(A), then PAsaysIdAψ1 ∈ sub(φ).
The last three clauses in Deﬁnition 5 are used to ensure that C5 and C6 hold. Note that in Clause 5, we consider disjunction
over sets of formulas 1 and 2. Formulas which are not disjunctions are understood as disjunctions over singleton sets,
e.g., ϕ ∧ ψ =∨{ϕ ∧ ψ}. To obtain the analog of Proposition 3, we need to ensure that formulas appearing within the scope
of says are closed under disjunction. We use sets of formulas to ensure that only ﬁnitely many disjunctions are introduced,
i.e., a disjunct need not be repeated. Due to Clauses 5 and 6, the number of subformulas is exponential in the size of φ. It
is possible to eliminate both these clauses, by ﬁltering the model that we construct here. But, this further ﬁltration is not
needed for the results proved in this work. Clause 7 is key to obtaining the analog of Proposition 4.
Given φ ∈ L, we will consider maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(φ). A set ⊆ sub(φ) is said to be maximal consistent iff
is consistent and for all ψ ∈ sub(φ) − ,  ∪ {ψ} is inconsistent. We write   ϕ to denote ∧ ⇒ ϕ. The deﬁnition of the
canonical model needs a few changes:
Deﬁnition 6 (Canonical model of φ). The canonical model of φ, denotedMφ = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO), is such that:
• S is the set of all maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(φ).
• (o1, . . . , oj) ∈ Ij (p,) iff p(o1, . . . , oj) ∈ .
• ′ ∈ δL(, IdA) iff for all ψ ∈ sub(φ) and Id′A ⊆ IdA, if saysId′Aψ ∈ , then ψ ∈ 
′.
• ′ ∈ δO(, A) iff for all ψ ∈ sub(φ), if OAψ ∈ , then ψ ∈ ′.
We will show that the canonical model of φ satisﬁes the frame constraints. We adapt Propositions 3 and 4 to obtain
Propositions 5 and 6 resply.
Proposition 5. The canonical model of φ satisﬁes the frame constraints C3–C6.
Proof. The proof that C3 and C4 hold are left to the reader. We discuss the case for C5. Given Mφ = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO),
consider some  ∈ S. If δL(, IdA) = ∅, then C5 is vacuously satisﬁed. Otherwise, let ′ ∈ δL(, IdA). There are two cases to
consider.
First, we have the boundary case, where there is no subformula saysId′
A
ϕ′ ∈ sub(φ) such that Id′
A
⊆ IdA. By deﬁnition,
δL(, IdA) = S. Consider the set F ⊆ sub(φ) such that ψ ∈ F iff ψ is of the form OB¬saysIdBϕ and ¬ϕ ∈ ′. We claim that F is
consistent. Since ′ is consistent, we can construct a model M′ with states S′, and s′ ∈ S′ such that (M′, s′) |=∧′. Without
loss of generality, we can assume that there exists s′′ ∈ S′ such that δO(s′′, A) = {s′′} and δL(s′′, IdB) = S′ for all B ∈ OP and
IdB ⊆ l(B). Note that states, such as s′′, trivially satisfy the frame constraints, and can be added to any model. It is easy to see
that (M′, s′′) |=∧ F , and by soundness, F is consistent. We can extend F into a maximal consistent set 1 such that for all
2 ∈ δO(1, B), we have ′ ∈ δL(2, IdB). Since δL(, IdA) = S, we have 1 ∈ δL(, IdA), and C5 is satisﬁed.
For the second case we proceed as follows. Let Id*
A
be the largest subset of IdA such that there is a subformula saysId*
A
ϕ′ ∈
sub(φ). The existence of a largest subset is guaranteed by Clause 5 in Deﬁnition 5. Fix IdB ⊆ l(B). If there is no subformula
saysId′
B
ψ ′ ∈ sub(φ)with Id′B ⊆ IdB, then δL(, IdA) ⊆ δL(, IdB) = S, and C5 is satisﬁed. Otherwise, let Id*B be the largest subset
of IdB such that there is a subformula saysId*
B
ψ ′ ∈ sub(φ). We proceed by contradiction analogous to the completeness proof:
• ′ ∈ δL(, IdB). By construction, there exists ψ ∈ sub(φ) such that saysId′
B
ψ ∈  for some Id′B ⊆ l(B) and ¬ψ ∈ ′. And,
using A3,   saysId*
B
ψ .
• For all1 ∈ δL(, IdA), there exists2 ∈ δO(1, B),′ ∈ δL(2, IdB). By Proposition 6 (below), there exists ϕ ∈ sub(φ) such
that saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ sub(φ),   saysId*
A
PBsaysId*
B
ϕ and ¬ϕ ∈ ′.
Since  saysId*
B
(ϕ ∨ ψ) and  saysId*
A
PBsaysId*
B
(ϕ ∨ ψ), we have  saysId*
A
(ϕ ∨ ψ). Using Clause 6 inDeﬁnition 5, there
exists saysId*
A
ϕ1 ∈ sub(φ) such that  ϕ1 ⇔ (ϕ ∨ ψ). As a result, saysId*
A
ϕ1 ∈ , and hence ϕ1 ∈ ′. Since  ϕ1 ⇔ (ϕ ∨ ψ), we
have ϕ ∈ ′ or ψ ∈ ′, which contradicts the fact that ¬ϕ ∈ ′ and ¬ψ ∈ ′. The proof of C6 is similar. 
Proposition 6. Given φ ∈ L, IdA ⊆ l(A) and IdB ⊆ l(B) such that there are largest subsets Id*A ⊆ IdA and Id*B ⊆ IdB with formulas
saysId*
A
ϕ′ ∈ sub(φ) and saysId*
B
ψ ′ ∈ sub(φ), let Mφ = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO) be the canonical model of φ. Then, for all  ∈ S and
′ ∈ δL(, IdA):
• If for all1 ∈ δL(, IdA), there exists2 ∈ δO(1, B) such that′ ∈ δL(2, IdB), then there existsϕ ∈ sub(φ) such that saysId*
B
ϕ ∈
sub(φ),   saysId*
A
PBsaysId*
B
ϕ and ¬ϕ ∈ ′.
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Proof. Fix  and ′ ∈ δL(, IdA). We proceed by contradiction. Suppose for all ϕ ∈ sub(φ) with saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ sub(φ), if  
saysIdAPBsaysIdBϕ, then ¬ϕ ∈ ′. Let F be the smallest set such that:• If saysId′
A
ϕ ∈  for some Id′
A
⊆ IdA, then ϕ ∈ F .
• If ¬ψ ∈ ′ and OB¬saysId*
B
ψ ∈ sub(φ), then OB¬saysId*
B
ψ ∈ F .
We claim that F is consistent (see Footnote 5). Suppose not:
(1) There exists {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕn,OB¬saysId*
B
ψ1, . . . ,OB¬saysId*
B
ψm} ⊆ F such that:  ¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ∧ OB¬saysId*
B
ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧
OB¬saysId*
B
ψm).
(2)  ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ⇒ PBsaysId*
B
(ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm) (from (1) using A1, A4, R1 and R2).
(3)  saysId*
A
(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn ⇒ PBsaysId*
B
(ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm)) ∈  (from (2) using R2).
(4) By construction,  saysId*
A
ϕi for all 1 i  n. So, usingA2 and (3), we can derive that  saysId*
A
PBsaysId*
B
(ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨
ψm). Using Clause 6 in Deﬁnition 5, there exists ψ
′ ∈ sub(φ) such that saysId*
B
ψ ′ ∈ sub(φ) and  ψ ′ ⇔ (ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm).
It follows that   saysId*
A
PBsaysId*
B
ψ ′, and by assumption, ¬ψ ′ ∈ ′, i.e., ′  ψ ′. As a result, ′  ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ψm, and
there exists 1 i  m such that ψi ∈ ′ (since ψi ∈ sub(φ)).
(5) By construction, ¬ψi ∈ ′ for all 1 i  m, which together with (4) gives us a contradiction.
We can extend F into a maximal consistent set 1 such that 1 ∈ δL(, IdA). Consider 2 ∈ δO(1, B). We claim that for all
Id′B ⊆ IdB, if saysId′Bϕ ∈ 2, then ϕ ∈ ′. Suppose not. There exists saysId′Bϕ ∈ 2 such that ¬ϕ ∈ ′. Using Clauses 5 and 6 in
Deﬁnition 5, it follows that saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ sub(φ), and using A3, saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ 2. Since saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ sub(φ), by Clause 7 in Deﬁnition 5,
OB¬saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ sub(φ). By construction, OB¬saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ 1, and so, ¬saysId*
B
ϕ ∈ 2, contradicting the consistency of 2. This
sufﬁces to conclude that ′ ∈ δL(2, IdB) for all 2 ∈ δO(1, B), giving us a contradiction. 
A standard argument (see, for example, [29]) can be used to show that for all ϕ ∈ sub(φ), (Mφ ,) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ . We can
now establish decidability:
Theorem 2 (Decidability). Given a propositional ϕ ∈ L, checking whether  ϕ is decidable.
Proof. Decidability is established via the bounded model property:
φ is satisﬁable inMφ iff φ is satisﬁable.
One direction is trivial, i.e., if φ is satisﬁable inMφ , then φ is satisﬁable (by deﬁnition). For the other direction, we can use a
standard ﬁltration argument, to show thatMφ can be obtained from the canonical model (Deﬁnition 4). 
We set aside the issue of complexity, and more importantly, the identiﬁcation of tractable fragments to future work. The
techniques discussed here would be most relevant to such an investigation. In the following section, we will use provability
(and its negation) to describe the process of saying.
3.3. The saying component – policies
In this section,we describe the representation and evaluation of policies or regulations. The result of evaluating regulation
is a set of utterances,which forms the basis for access control and conformance. The formalismdevelopedhere is an extension
of [14], and is ageneralized formof logicprogramming. Logicprogramsarepopular in representing regulatory texts [23,43,52],
and access control policies [9,12,39]. We begin by deﬁning the syntax of regulations:
Deﬁnition 7 (Syntax of regulation). Given countable sets of identiﬁers ID, principal names OP , and a function l : OP → 2ID,
a law is a statement of the form (id) ϕ → ψ , where ϕ ∈ Lϕ , ψ ∈ Lψ , and there exists A ∈ OP such that id ∈ l(A). The set of all
possible laws is denoted by Laws(OP, l, L), abbreviated Laws.
A body of regulation Reg ⊆ Laws is a ﬁnite set such that for all id ∈ ID, there exists at most one pair (ϕ,ψ) ∈ Lϕ × Lψ such
that (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg.
(id) ϕ → ψ is read as: “If ϕ is true, then A says ψ via the law (id)”, where id ∈ l(A). To evaluate laws, we need a way
to evaluate preconditions (ϕ ∈ Lϕ). There are two kinds of atoms in Lϕ – predicates and formulas of the form saysIdyϕ. The
predicates are evaluated against a state, and formulas of the form saysIdyϕ are evaluated provability (as deﬁned in Section 3.2)
from a set of utterances. We begin by deﬁning states:
Deﬁnition 8 (States and assignments). Given countable setsO of object names, principal namesOP ⊆ O, and predicate names
1, . . . ,n, a state s(O, OP, 1, . . . ,n), abbreviated s, is the tuple (I1 , . . . , In ) where Ij : j → 2O
j
is the interpretation of
predicates of arity j. Given p ∈ j , we will say that p(o1, . . . , oj) is true at state s iff (o1, . . . , oj) ∈ Ij (p). The set of all states is
denoted by S .
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Given a set of variables X , and principal variables XP , an assignment is a function v : X → O, such that for all x ∈ XP , we
have v(x) ∈ OP . The set of all assignments is denoted by V(X, XP , O, OP), abbreviated V .
A state s ∈ S is a description of operations, and gives us information, for example, about the accesses to records that
actually happened. The deﬁnition of utterances relies on propositionalizing formulas:
Deﬁnition 9 (Propositionalization). Given φ ∈ L and an assignment v ∈ V , the propositionalization of ϕ w.r.t. v, denoted v(φ),
is deﬁned inductively as follows:
• v(p(y1, . . . , yn)) = p(o1, . . . , on), where oi = v(yi) if yi ∈ X and oi = yi otherwise (yi ∈ O).
• v(ϕ ∧ ψ) = v(ϕ) ∧ v(ψ), and v(¬ϕ) = ¬v(ϕ).
• v(Oyϕ) = OA(v(ϕ)), where A = v(y) if y ∈ XP and A = y otherwise.
• v(saysIdyϕ) = saysIdA (v(ϕ)), where IdA = l(v(y)) if y ∈ XP and IdA = Idy otherwise.
We can now deﬁne utterances:
Deﬁnition 10 (Utterances). Given a body of regulation Reg, and an assignment v ∈ V , an utterance is a statement v(says{id}ψ)
such that id ∈ ID and (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg. The set of all utterances is denoted by U(Reg, V).
To build intuition for the deﬁnitions, we ﬁrst present a simpliﬁed version, which can accommodate some (but not all)
kinds of regulations. Wewill then identify the difﬁcult cases, and generalize the deﬁnition. Let us assume as given a state s, a
body of regulation Reg and an assignment v ∈ V . We wish to determine whether the precondition of a law (ϕ ∈ Lϕ) is “true”
w.r.t. s, Reg and v. Consider the relation (s,Reg, v) |=1 ϕ deﬁned inductively as follows:
P1 (s,Reg, v) |=1 p(y1, . . . , yj) iff (o1, . . . , oj) ∈ Ij (p), where oi = v(yi) if yi ∈ X and oi = yi otherwise.
P2 Conjunction and negation are handled in the usual way.
P3 (s,Reg, v) |=1 saysIdyψ ′ iff there exists a set U ⊆ U(Reg, V) such that:
P3.1 For all φ ∈ U, there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v′ ∈ V such that (s,Reg, v′) |=1 ϕ and φ = v′(says{id}ψ), and
P3.2 U  v(saysIdyψ ′).
P3 is understood as follows. (s,Reg, v) |=1 saysIdyψ ′ iff there is a set of utterances U such that all formulas in U come from
laws with true preconditions (P3.1), and v(saysIdyψ
′) is provable from U (P3.2). We remind the reader that provability is
deﬁned in the propositional subset of the language L (Section 3.2). We now give an example to illustrate this deﬁnition:
Proposition 7. Given a principal A ∈ OP with l(A) = {id1, id2}, and a body regulation Reg consisting of only the following
statements:
(id1) p(x) → ¬q(x).
(id2) ¬says{id1}¬q(y) → q(y).
Then for all s ∈ S and v ∈ V, we have:
1. (s,Reg, v) |=1 (¬p(x)) ⇔ says{id2}q(x).
2. (s,Reg, v) |=1 saysl(A)⊥.
Proof. The laws correspond to a standard pattern in default reasoning. The law (id1) is understood as an exception, and read
as “If p(x) holds, then A says ¬q(x) via law (id1)”. The law (id2) is the default, and read as “If A does not say ¬q(x) via law (id1),
then A says q(x) via law (id2)”.
The proofs of both items rely on a property of utterances that satisfy P3.1. Given a state s, let Us be the set of utterances
such that for all v ∈ V :
• If (s,Reg, v) |= p(x), then v(says{id1}¬q(x)) ∈ Us.
• Otherwise, v(says{id2}¬q(x)) ∈ Us.
It is easy to show that U1 satisﬁes P3.1 iff U1 ⊆ Us.
Item 1: Suppose (s,Reg, v) |=1 ¬p(x) for some v ∈ V . Then, v(says{id2}q(x)) ∈ Us. Hence, Us  v(says{id2}q(x)) (satisfying P3.2),
and hence (s,Reg, v) |=1 v(says{id2}q(x)). The converse is similarly veriﬁed.
Item 2: Suppose (s,Reg, v) |=1 saysl(A)⊥. It follows that there exists U1 satisfying P3.1 such that U1  saysl(A)⊥. However, it is
easily seen that Us  saysl(A)⊥, and since U1 ⊆ Us, by propositional reasoning, U1  saysl(A)⊥, giving us a contradiction. 
We note that there is nothing intrinsic about the formalism that prevents conﬂicts in a principal’s laws. It is easy to
construct a regulation Reg such that for all s ∈ S and v ∈ V , we have (s,Reg, v) |=1 saysl(A)⊥. One has to explicitly prevent
conﬂicts via the use of default rules, e.g., (id2) in the example above. It is also possible to modify P3 so that utterances with
conﬂicts are not used, which would be in line with the approach of defeasible logic [20,26,47]. But, we do not explore this
option in this work.
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Next, we illustrate the sense in which regulations are non-monotonic:
Proposition 8. There exist regulations Reg and Reg′ such that Reg ⊂ Reg′, and a state s ∈ S , an assignment v ∈ V and a formula
ϕ ∈ Lϕ such that:
(s,Reg, v) |=1 ϕ and (s,Reg′, v) |=1 ϕ.
Proof. We will give an example similar to the default rules discussed above. The key idea is to make use of a formula
saysl(A)ψ , where l(A) has some identiﬁers without corresponding laws in Reg. Let l(A) = {id1, id2, id3}, and Reg consists of
only the following two laws:
(id1) ¬saysl(A)¬q(x) → q(x).
(id2) p(x) → ¬q(x).
We construct Reg′ by adding a law, which conveys an exception, to Reg:
(id3) r(x) → ¬q(x).
Given s ∈ S and v ∈ V such that (s,Reg, v) |=1 r(x) ∧ ¬p(x) (the exception in (id3) applies, but the exception in (id2) does not),
it follows that (s,Reg, v) |=1 saysl(A)q(x) and (s,Reg′, v) |=1 saysl(A)q(x). 
As we mentioned, |=1 is not well-deﬁned for all kinds of regulations:
Proposition 9. There is no relation |=1 that satisﬁes the properties P1–P3.
Proof. Given A ∈ OP and l(A) = {id}, consider a regulation Reg that consists of only the following statement:
(id) ¬says{id}p(x) → p(x).
In other words, “If A does not say p(x) via law (id), then A says p(x) via law (id)”. The self-referential nature of this sentence,
together with negation, is the source of the problem. We begin by observing that for all v ∈ V and U ⊆ U , U  v(says{id}p(x))
iff v(says{id}p(x)) ∈ U.
Suppose (s,Reg, v) |=1 says{id}p(x). By P3.2, there exists a set U such that U  v(says{id}p(x)), and so, v(says{id}p(x)) ∈ U. As
a result, by P3.1, (s,Reg, v) |=1 ¬says{id}p(x), giving us a contradiction.
Suppose (s,Reg, v) |=1 says{id}p(x). Then, (s,Reg, v) |= ¬says{id}p(x). The set U = {v(says{id}p(x))} satisﬁes P3.1 and P3.2. So,
(s,Reg, v) |=1 says{id}p(x), giving us a contradiction. 
To handle such circular statements, we use a technique from Kripke’s theory of truth [37], which also forms the basis for
the Kripke–Kleene–Fitting semantics of logic programs [15]. There are two pieces of machinery needed. First, we move to a
three-valued logic, where the third (middle) value stands for ungrounded. The values are denoted byB3 = {, ?,⊥}. Second,
we modify P3 to use a pair of sets of utterances (U,U ′) such that U ⊆ U ′. Informally, U will be the set of utterances obtained
from laws with true preconditions, while U ′ will be set of utterances from laws with true or ungrounded preconditions (by
modifying P3.1). The truth of saysIdyϕ will determined using U, and falsity is determined using U
′ (by modifying P3.2). We
note that it is not possible to deﬁne the three-valued interpretation in a manner isomorphic to P1–P3. This is because P3
implicitly assumes the existence of a unique ﬁxed point, and this assumption no longer holds in the three-valued setting.
We move the choice of (U,U ′) and P3.1 to a separate deﬁnition (Deﬁnition 12), and consider P1, P2, and a modiﬁed version
of P3.2 together for a ﬁxed (U,U ′) (Deﬁnition 11).
We begin by deﬁning a function tv which assigns truth values to preconditions:
Deﬁnition 11 (Evaluating preconditions). Given a body of regulation Reg and a pair utterance sets (U,U ′) such that U ⊆ U ′ ⊆
U(Reg, V), the function tv(U,U ′) : Lϕ × S × V →B3 is deﬁned as follows:
Predicates are evaluated to true or false. Conjunction and negation are handled using the Kleene semantics
tv(U,U ′)(saysIdyψ , s, v) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 if U  v(saysIdyψ)
⊥ if U ′  v(saysIdyψ)
? otherwise
Note that if U = U ′, then tv(U,U ′)(saysIdyψ , s, v) ∈ {,⊥}, and is identical to P3.2. The third value arises only if UU ′.
We now deﬁne consistency for the pair of utterances (U,U ′), used in Deﬁnition 11. We need to ensure that U (resply. U ′)
corresponds to laws with true (resply. true or ungrounded) preconditions:
Deﬁnition 12 (Consistent utterances). Given a regulation Reg and a state s ∈ S , the utterance pair (U,U ′) is consistent iff for
all φ ∈ U(Reg, V):
• If φ ∈ U, then there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id}ψ) = φ and tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = .
• If φ ∈ U ′, then for all (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id}ψ) = φ, we have tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊥.
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CsU(Reg,V) = {(U,U ′)| (U,U ′) ∈ 2U(Reg,V) × 2U(Reg,V) and (U,U ′) is consistent} is the set of all consistent utterance pairs w.r.t. Reg,
V and s.
It is immediate from the deﬁnition that for all (U,U ′) ∈ CSU(Reg,V), we have U ⊆ U ′. Consider the self-referential ex-
ample (from Proposition 9) – (id) ¬says{id}p(x) → p(x). For this example, any pair (U,U ′) such that v(says{id}p(x)) ∈ U or
v(says{id}p(x)) ∈ U ′ is not consistent, as that wouldmean assigning a value from {,⊥} to the says{id}p(x). Consistency ensures
that tv(U,U ′)(says{id}p(x), s, v) = ? for all s ∈ S , v ∈ V and consistent pairs (U,U ′). A partial order is deﬁned over the space of
consistent utterance pairs:
Deﬁnition 13 (Partial order). Given the utterance pairs (U1, U
′
1
) and (U2, U
′
2
), we say that (U1, U
′
1
) (U2, U ′2) iff U1 ⊆ U2 and
U ′
1
⊇ U ′
2
.
The pair (CsU(Reg,V),) is a partially ordered set (poset).
We are now ready to deﬁne the function whose ﬁxed points we will be interested in.
Deﬁnition 14 (Inﬂationary function). Given a poset (CsU(Reg,V),), the function IsU(Reg,V) : CsU(Reg,V) → CsU(Reg,V) is deﬁned as
follows. IsU(Reg,V)(U1, U ′1) is the pair (U2, U ′2) ∈ CsU(Reg,V) such that for all φ ∈ U(Reg, V):
• φ ∈ U2 iff there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id}ψ) = φ and tv(U1 ,U ′1)(ϕ, s, v) = .• φ ∈ U ′
2
iff for all (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id}ψ) = φ, we have tv(U1 ,U ′1)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊥.
The existence of ﬁxed points relies on some properties of ISU(Reg,V), i.e., being inﬂationary and monotonic:
Proposition 10. Given a poset (CsU(Reg,V),), abbreviated (CU ,), the function IsU(Reg,V), abbreviated IU , is:
1. Inﬂationary – For all (U1, U
′
1
) ∈ CU , (U1, U ′1) IU (U1, U ′1).
2. Well-deﬁned – For all (U1, U
′
1
) ∈ CU , IU (U1, U ′1) ∈ CU .
3. Monotonic – For all {(U1, U ′1), (U2, U ′2)} ∈ CSU , if (U1, U ′1) (U2, U ′2), then IU (U1, U ′1) IU (U2, U ′2).
Proof. Item 1: Let (U2, U
′
2
) = IU (U1, U ′1). We are given that (U1, U ′1) is consistent. Hence, for all φ ∈ U:• If φ ∈ U1, then by Deﬁnition 12, there exists (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id}ψ) = φ and tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = .
Therefore, by Deﬁnition 14, φ ∈ U2. We can conclude that U1 ⊆ U2.
• If φ ∈ U2, then by Deﬁnition 12, for all (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id}ψ) = φ, we have tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊥.
Therefore, by Deﬁnition 14, φ ∈ U2. We can conclude that U1 ⊇ U2.
Hence, by Deﬁnition 13, (U1, U
′
1
) (U2, U ′2).
Interlude: For the second and third items, we need the following observations. Given U1 ⊆ U ′1 ⊆ U and U2 ⊆ U ′2 ⊆ U , if
(U1, U
′
1
) (U2, U ′2), then for all ϕ ∈ Lϕ and v ∈ V(X, O):
(D1) If tv(U1 ,U ′1)(ϕ, s, v) = , then tv(U2 ,U ′2)(ϕ, s, v) = .
(D2) If tv(U1 ,U ′1)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊥, then tv(U2 ,U ′2)(ϕ, s, v) = ⊥.
These are established easily by induction over the structure of ϕ. Note that the claims are for all pairs of utterances, and not
just the consistent ones.
Item 2: Let (U2, U
′
2
) = IU (U1, U ′1). From Item 1, it follows that (U1, U ′1) (U2, U ′2). Suppose, for the purpose of contradiction,
that (U2, U
′
2
) is not consistent. Then, by Deﬁnition 12, there exists φ ∈ U such that:
• φ ∈ U2 and for all (id) ϕ → ψ ∈ Reg and v ∈ V such that v(says{id}ψ) = φ, we have tv(U2 ,U ′2)(ϕ, s, v) = , and by (D1),
tv(U1 ,U ′1)(ϕ, s, v) = . Therefore, by Deﬁnition 14, φ ∈ U2, giving us a contradiction.• The second case (where φ ∈ U ′
2
) is contradicted similarly using (D2).
The proof of Item 3 is along similar lines. 
The existence of ﬁxed points is established using Zorn’s lemma (cf. [50]), which applies to chain-complete posets. Given a
poset (CsU(Reg,V),), a set C′ ⊆ CsU(Reg,V) is called a chain (totally ordered set) if for all (U1, U ′1), (U2, U ′2) ∈ C′, we have (U1, U ′1)
(U2, U
′
2
) or (U2, U
′
2
) (U1, U ′1). A poset is chain-complete if every chain has a supremum. We now show that (CsU(Reg,V),) is
a chain-complete poset:
Proposition 11. (CsU(Reg,V),) is a chain-complete poset.
Proof. Given a chain C′ ⊆ CsU(Reg,V), consider the pair (Us, U ′s) deﬁned as follows:
Us =
⋃
(U,U ′)∈C′
U, U ′s =
⋂
(U,U ′)∈C′
U ′
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It is immediate from the construction that ∀(U,U ′) ∈ C′ : (U,U ′) (Us, U ′s). It is also easy to see that if (Us, U ′s) is consistent,
then it is the supremum of C′. Thus, it sufﬁces to show that (Us, U ′s) is consistent, and this can be established by an argument
similar to the proof of Proposition 10. 
Theorem 3. Given a poset of consistent utterance pairs (CsU(Reg,V),) and a function IsU(Reg,V) : CsU(Reg,V) → CsU(Reg,V) which is
inﬂationary and monotonic, IsU(Reg,V) has a least ﬁxed point and a maximal ﬁxed point.
The proof is obtained as a corollary to Zorn’s Lemma (cf. [50]), and we refer the reader to [14] for the argument.6
To obtain the least ﬁxed point, we consider the pair (U0, U
′
0
) ∈ CsU(Reg,V), where U0 = ∅ and U ′0 = U(Reg, V). Let (Ui, U ′i ) =
IsU(Reg,V)(Ui−1, U ′i−1) for i  1. It is easy to see that if |U(Reg, V)| is ﬁnite (i.e., the number of objects O is ﬁnite), then there
exists n ∈ N such that (Un, U ′n) is the least ﬁxed point, i.e., (Un, U ′n) = (Un+i, U ′n+i) for all i ∈ N. We also note that in the case of
ﬁnite domains, |CsU(Reg,V)| is ﬁnite, and so, the maximal ﬁxed points can be enumerated (in theory). To make the approach
practical, restrictions are needed. In [13], we explored an assumption that lets us compile out occurrences of says in the
preconditions of laws, leading to efﬁcient checking for states with a large number of objects. These methods need to be
extended to accommodate reasoning that arises via representation (axioms A5 and A6), and we leave an investigation to
future work.
A state s together with a consistent utterance pair forms the basis for all decision problems.We deﬁne a notion of validity
at a state, which we will use to formalize access control and conformance decisions (in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 resply.):
Deﬁnition 15 (Validity at a state). Given a state s, a body of regulation Reg, a consistent utterance pair (U,U ′) ∈ CsU(Reg,V) and
a propositional ϕ ∈ Lϕ , we say that ϕ is valid at sw.r.t. Reg and (U,U ′), denoted (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ, iff tv(U,U ′)(ϕ, s, v) =  for all
v ∈ V .
The choice of which utterance pair to use depends on the application. If there is a unique (least) ﬁxed point, then it is the
appropriate choice. However, matters are not so clear when there are multiple ﬁxed points. We conclude this section with a
discussion of examples to build intuition about the deﬁnitions of access control and conformance.
3.3.1. Examples
We discuss two examples. First, we consider the statements from HIPAA (presented in Section 3.1 and also discussed
Section 3.2.2). A unique ﬁxed pointwill be obtained for these statements. Second,we consider an example involvingmultiple
ﬁxed points.
Example 1. Consider the statements from HIPPA in Section 3.1. Let H ∈ OP stand for the regulatory authority behind HIPPA,
and l(H) = {1,1a,1b}. As we discussed in Section 3.2.2, the phrase has the right is analysed as a power. We use the following
abbreviation:
hasRight(x, z,ϕ) = Pxsaysl(x)Ozsaysl(z)Pxϕ.
The HIPAA rule is formalized as follows:
(1) pat(x) ∧ rec(y, x, z) ∧ ¬says{1a,1b}e(y) → hasRight(x, z, access(x, y)).
(1a) psyNotes(y1) → e(y1).
(1b) compForLegal(y2) → e(y2).
The law (1) is read as follows: “If x is a patient (pat(x)), and y is a record of xmaintained by z (rec(y, x, z)), and HIPPA does
not say that there is an exception applying to y (¬says{1a,1b}e(y)), then HIPAA says that x has the right to access her records
via the law (1)”.
The law (1a) is read as follows: “If y1 is a record of psychotherapy notes (psyNotes(y1)), then HIPAA says that an exception
applies to y1 via the law (1a)”. And, the law (1b) is read as follows: “If y2 is a record compiled for legal proceedings
(compForLegal(y2)), then HIPAA says that an exception applies to y2 via the law (1b)”.
We set aside the important problem of deﬁning these predicates further, i.e., the deﬁnitional aspects of the law [33]. For
example, HIPPA provides rules describing who counts as a patient, and the interpretation of pat(x) is dependent on these
rules. In addition, the predicate e(y) could be interpreted as a permission to the maintainer of y not to grant access.7 Such
extensions are easily accommodated.
Suppose Alice (A) wants to view her records (r) which are maintained by Bob (B). Alice introduces the following rule:
(2) Bob must show me my records.
6 Kripke [37] describes Theorem 3 as being well-known to logicians. However, we have not found a standard reference for this proof.
7 Our understanding of the HIPAA rule is that (1a) and (1b) are only meant to cancel the right provided by (1), and do not entail any explicit permission
to the maintainer of the records.
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Table 1
A state and ﬁxed point utterances for the HIPAA example.
Objs Predicates Fixed point utterances
H pat(A), rec(r, A, B) says{1b}e(r)
A, r ¬psyNotes(r) says{2} OBsaysl(B) PBaccess(A, r)
B compForLegal(r) says{3} PHsaysl(H) OBsaysl(B) PAaccess(A, r)
Table 2
A state and distinct maximal ﬁxed points obtained from the Nixon-diamond example.
Objs Predicates Fixed point 1 Fixed point 2
N q(N), r(N), ¬p(N) says{4} ONp(N) says{5} ON¬p(N)
As discussed in Section 3.2.2, the manner in which this rule arises is left unspeciﬁed. For example, Alice may send an e-mail
to Bob, requiring to see her records. Alice’s law is formalized as follows. Let A ∈ OP stand for Alice, and B ∈ OP stand for Bob.
In addition, l(A) = {2}. Law (2) is formally expressed as:
(2)  → OBsaysl(B)PBaccess(A, r).
Bob complies with this request via his access control policy. Suppose Bob’s policy consists of the following rule:
(3) HIPAA is permitted to require me to permit a patient to access her records.
Let l(B) = {3}. Law (3) is formally expressed as:
(3) pat(x3) ∧ rec(y3, x3, B) → PHsaysl(H)OBsaysl(B)Px3access(x3, y3).
Table 1 shows a state together with the ﬁxed point utterances obtained from l(H), l(A), and l(B). Here, r is a record about
Alice maintained by Bob (rec(r, A, B)), which has been compiled for legal proceedings (compForLegal(r)). The precondition of
HIPAA’s law (1b) is true, and we obtain the utterance says{1b}e(r). As a result, the precondition of (1) is false, and no right is
granted to Alice. The preconditions of Alice’s and Bob’s laws ((2) and (3) resply.) are true, and the corresponding utterances
are obtained.
Let us consider the questions of access control and conformance informally, given the state and ﬁxed point in Table 1. Is
Alice permitted to access her record? No, because HIPAA does not require Bob to permit her to access it. Is Bob conformant?
On one hand, HIPAA does not require anything of Bob, so yes. On the other hand, Alice says that Bob is required to permit her
to access her records, and he does not comply with this request. Thus, conformance is better seen as a relation between two
principals w.r.t. a set of laws. In Section 3.5, we will say that B conforms to Aw.r.t. the laws l(A) iff B satisﬁes the obligations
imposed by those laws.
Example 2.We now discuss an example involving multiple ﬁxed points, based on the well-known Nixon-diamond problem
in Default Logic [49]. Consider the following laws:
(4) Except as otherwise speciﬁed, quakers must be paciﬁsts.
(5) Except as otherwise speciﬁed, republicans must not be paciﬁsts.
The laws are formally expressed as:
(4) q(x) ∧ ¬says{5}¬Oxp(x) → Oxp(x).
(5) r(x) ∧ ¬says{4}¬Ox¬p(x) → Ox¬p(x).
Law (4) is read as “If x is a quaker (q(x)), and the regulator does not say that x is not required to be a paciﬁst (p(x)) via
law (5), then the regulator says that x must be a paciﬁst via law (4)”. Law (5) is read similarly, and r(x) is read as: “x is a
republican”.
Table 2 gives an example of a state, where a principal (N) for Nixon is a quaker (q(N)), a republican (r(N)), but not a paciﬁst
(¬p(N)). The least ﬁxed point is given by (U,U ′), whereU = ∅ andU ′ consists of all utterances. The preconditions of both laws
are ungrounded. This corresponds to skeptical reasoning in non-monotonic logic.
Two maximal ﬁxed points are obtained. In the ﬁrst ﬁxed point in Table 2, denoted (U1, U
′
1
), we have U1 = U ′1 ={says{4}ONp(N)}. The precondition of law (4) (resply., law (5)) is true (resply., false). In the second ﬁxed point in Table 2,
denoted (U2, U
′
2
), we have U2 = U ′2 = {says{5}ON¬p(N)}. The precondition of law (5) (resply., law (4)) is true (resply., false).
The maximal ﬁxed points correspond to credulous reasoning in non-monotonic logic.
Let us consider the question of conformance informally. Given the state in Table 2, does the principal N conform to the
regulation? The answer depends on which ﬁxed point we consider. If we consider the ﬁrst ﬁxed point, then the answer is no,
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because N is not a paciﬁst. If we consider the second ﬁxed point, then the answer is yes, for the same reason. We note that if
N was not both a quaker and a republican, a unique ﬁxed point is obtained.
While theNixon-diamond construction arises in the area of knowledge representation, the question of interest iswhether
there are regulations where multiple ﬁxed points are needed. We have not encountered such examples.8
3.4. Non-interference in access control
An access control decision is made when a principal A requests the performance of action p which is controlled by B.
Given a state s, regulation Reg and ﬁxed point (U,U ′) resulting from the evaluation of policy, the decision problem is whether
(s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysl(B)PA(p), i.e., does B say that A is permitted to perform p.
A problem with this deﬁnition is that the policies in access control are usually distributed. It is unreasonable to expect
(U,U ′) to reside on a single system. Given that we wish to evaluate saysl(B)PA(p), the question is whether a smaller set of
utterances sufﬁce to answer this question. In other words, the evaluation should be carried out locally by B or a designated
evaluator for B, as in [6].
Non-interference properties are used to obtain such results, and to demonstrate that the logic protects the rights of each
principal [2,17]. In our case, the access control decision is of the form (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdBψ , and this holds iff U  saysIdBψ .
The goal is to identify a subset of utterances (U* ⊆ U), such that U  saysIdBψ iff U*  saysIdBψ .
Let us consider an example to build some intuition. Suppose we have four principals A, B, C, and D, with l(A) = {id1},
l(B) = {id2}, l(C) = {id3}, and l(D) = {id4}. Suppose C is a patient, and A and B maintain records about C. A only permits C to
access her records, while B permits C to permit hermother (D) to access her records. LetU consist of the following utterances:
(u1) saysl(A)PCaccess(C, r).
(u2) saysl(B)PCsaysl(C)PDaccess(D, r1).
(u3) saysl(C)PDaccess(D, r1).
Now, suppose Dwants to access C’s records that are maintained by A. It is easy to see that U  saysl(A)PDaccess(D, r). But, do
we need all of the utterances in U to make this determination? Intuitively, no, because the only utterance from A is (u1) and
there is no representation conveyed via (u1). So, (u1) alone should sufﬁce to make this determination. In this case, we say
that (u2) and (u3) do not interfere with the access control decision.
Next, suppose D wants to access C’s records that are maintained by B. It follows that U  saysl(B)PDaccess(D, r1),
and so D is indeed granted access. Here, (u2) is certainly relevant, and since it gives the power of representation to C,
(u3) is also relevant. However, no mention of A is made by (u2) or (u3), and so, (u1) does not interfere with the access control
decision.
We begin by deﬁning the subset of utterances that are relevant to an access control decision:
Deﬁnition 16 (Reachable utterances). Given a set of utterances U and a formula saysIdBψ , U
*
IdB
is the smallest set such that:
• If idB ∈ IdB and says{idB}ϕ ∈ U, says{idB}ϕ ∈ U*IdB .
• If says{idB}ϕ ∈ U*IdB and saysIdAψ
′ is a subformula of ϕ, then U*
IdA
⊆ U*
IdB
.
If we think of formulas saysIdBψ as pointing to utterances in U (labeled IdB), then U
*
IdB
is the set of utterances that are
pointed to directly (the ﬁrst clause), or pointed to by subformulas of utterances that are pointed to (the second clause). In
these terms, the computation of the set U*
IdB
corresponds to a reachability computation on a graph, and hence, we call it the
set of reachable utterances. We believe that it is reasonable to restrict to the reachable utterances, because given the question
saysl(B)ψ , U
*
l(B)
is determined by B and the principals to whom she grants the power of representation. We can now show the
following:
Theorem 4 (Non-interference). Given a set of utterances U, for all saysIdBψ ∈ L, we have U  saysIdBψ iff U*IdB  saysIdBψ .
Proof. One direction follows easily using propositional reasoning, i.e., if U*
IdB
 saysIdBψ , then U  saysIdBψ , since U*IdB ⊆ U.
For the other direction, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose U  saysIdBψ , and U*IdB  saysIdBψ . So, φ = U
*
IdB
∧ ¬saysIdBψ
is satisﬁable. LetM = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO) be a model of φ. Hence:
• There exists sφ ∈ S such that (M, sφ) |= φ for some sφ ∈ S, and
• There exists s¬ψ ∈ δL(s, IdB) such that (M, s¬ψ) |= ¬ψ .
We will construct a new model M′ with a state s* such that (M′, s*) |=∧U and (M′, s*) |= ¬saysIdBψ . This would contradict
the assumption that U  saysIdBψ . The main difﬁculty with the construction is that ψ may have a subformula saysIdCψ ′ such
that there is a statement says{idC }ϕ ∈ U − U*Id with idC ∈ IdC . Thus, changing the truth of says{idC }ϕ could result in a change in
the truth of saysIdCψ
′. Handling this case makes the construction involved.
8 It is tempting to analyse conﬂicting obligations that can arise in contrary-to-duty (CTD) structures (c.f. [48]) using multiple ﬁxed points. However, we
do not believe that this is the right approach. The analysis of CTD structures is left to future work.
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We construct a new modelM′ = (S′, I′1 , . . . , I′n , δ′L, δ′O) as follows:
The states S′: For each state s ∈ S, we assign a new state, denoted c(s), which is to be understood as a copy of s. We assume
that c(s) ∈ S and c(s) = c(s′) iff s = s′. Given S1 ⊆ S, c(S1) denotes the set of states such that c(s) ∈ c(S1) iff s ∈ S1. In addition,
we add two special states s* (at which the contradiction will be obtained) and sW (which provides witnesses as needed for
C5 and C6). S′ = S ∪ c(S) ∪ {s*, sW }.
Interpretation of predicates: I′1 , . . . , I
′
n
is the same as I1 , . . . , In with the copies of states having the same assignment as
the states in S. No predications hold at s* and sW .
Accessibility relation δ′O: δ′O respects δO for s ∈ S. δ′O(c(s), A) = c(δO(s, A)), for all A ∈ OP and c(s) ∈ c(S). In addition,
δO(s*, A) = {s*}, and δO(sW , A) = {sW }, for all A ∈ OP .
Accessibility relation δ′L: This is the main part of the construction. δ′L respects δL for s ∈ S. For all A ∈ OP and IdA ⊆ l(A),
δ′L(sW , IdA) = S′. We now describe the construction for the other states, starting with some notation.
Given IdA ⊆ l(A), let Id*A be the set such that for all idA ∈ IdA, idA ∈ Id*A iff idA ∈ IdB or there exists a subformula saysId′Aϕ ∈ U
*
IdB
such that idA ∈ Id′A.
The state s*- For all A ∈ OP and IdA ⊆ l(A), we have the following cases:
• If Id*
A
= IdA, then δ′L(s*, IdA) = ∅.
• Otherwise, δ′L(s*, IdA) = δL(sφ , IdA) ∪ c(δL(sφ , IdA)).
The ﬁrst clause ensures that (M′, s*) |= says{idA}ϕ for all says{idA}ϕ ∈ U − U*IdB , since {idA}
* = ∅. The second clause adds both
the states that are accessible from sφ and their copies. The accessibility relations associated with a copy (c(s¬ψ)) will be
modiﬁed in order to preserve C5.
The copies – For all C ∈ OP , IdC ⊆ l(C), and c(s) ∈ c(S):
• If c(s) ∈ δ′O(c(s¬ψ), C) or Id*A = IdA, then δ′L(c(s), IdC ) = c(δL(s, IdC )).
• Otherwise, δ′L(c(s), IdC ) = δL(sφ , IdC ) ∪ c(δL(sφ , IdC )) ∪ c(δL(s, IdC )) ∪ {sW }.
Note that the second clause does not affect the truth of any subformula in U*
IdB
, and it ensures that there are witnesses as
needed for C5 for the cases where δ′L(c(sφ), IdA) = ∅.
Frame constraints:We need to verify that the frame constraints hold in M′. The only difﬁculty is in showing that C5 holds
at the copies and s*. Fix A, C, IdA and IdC . Given c(s) ∈ c(S), there are two cases:
• c(s) ∈ δ′O(c(s¬ψ), A) or Id*A = IdA. By construction, δ′L(c(s), IdA) = c(δL(s, IdA)). Consider c(s′) ∈ δ′L(c(s), IdA). Since C5 holds
at s inM:
− s′ ∈ δL(s, IdC ), in which case c(s′) ∈ δ′L(c(s), IdC ), or
− There exists s1 ∈ δL(s, IdA) such that for all s2 ∈ δO(s1, C), we have s′ ∈ δL(s2, IdC ). By construction, for all c(s2) ∈
δ′O(c(s1), C), we have c(s′) ∈ c(δL(s2, IdC )) ⊆ δ′L(c(s2), IdC ).
• Otherwise, by construction, sW ∈ δL(c(s), IdA), and δ′O(sW , C) = {sW }. Since δ′L(c(s), IdA) ⊆ δ′L(sW , IdC ) = S′, C5 is trivially
satisﬁed.
Next we consider the state s* for which there are three cases:
1. Id*
A
= IdA. δ′L(s*, IdA) = ∅ and C5 is vacuously satisﬁed.
2. Id*
A
= IdA and Id*C = IdC . For each c(s) ∈ δ′O(c(s¬ψ), C), we have δ′L(s*, IdA) ⊆ δ′L(c(s), IdC ), thereby satisfying C5.
3. Id*
A
= IdA and Id*C = IdC . In this case, C5 is satisﬁed because C5 holds inM and the copies of states are isomorphic.
Establishing the contradiction: The following are established easily by induction:
(P1) For all s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ L, (M, s) |= ϕ iff (M′, s) |= ϕ.
(P2) For all s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ L such that for all subformulas saysIdAϕ′ of ϕ, Id*A = IdA, (M, s) |= ϕ iff (M′, c(s)) |= ϕ.
We can now reason as follows:
1. (M′, s*) |=∧U*
IdB
, since for all says{idA}ϕ ∈ U*IdB and s
′ ∈ δ′L(s*, {idA}), the following condition holds. Either s′ ∈ δ′L(sφ , {idA}),
in which case (M′, s) |= ϕ (using (P1)), or s′ ∈ δ′L(c(sφ), {idA}), in which case (M′, s′) |= ϕ (using (P2)).
2. (M′, s*) |= says{idA}ϕ, for all says{idA}ϕ ∈ U − U*IdB (by construction, since {idA}
* = {idA} and δ′L(s*, {idA}) = ∅).
3. Hence, (M′, s*) |=∧U.
4. (M′, s*) |= ¬saysIdBψ , since s¬ψ ∈ δL(s*, IdB), and (M′, s¬ψ) |= ¬ψ (using (P1)).
The last two items contradict the assumption that U  saysIdBψ . 
We note that the distinction between the inference component and the saying component allows us to restrict attention
to inferences of the form U  saysIdBϕ, where U only has formulas of the form saysIdAψ . If the set U could contain arbitrary
formulas, non-interference would have a more complex characterization, as in [17]. For example, if we allowed formulas of
the form ¬saysIdAψ in U, then any principal can render U inconsistent.
3.5. Conformance
We now turn to the deﬁnition of conformance. While the deﬁnition of conformance has some variation between the
various formalisms [4,14,19–21,27,38], all of them require a principal to satisfy the obligations that are imposed on her. In
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the context of contracts, several works [20,21,27,38] accommodate reasoning about mitigating actions such as “paying a
ﬁne” if an obligation is not satisﬁed. The analysis of such mitigating actions is left to future work.
We deﬁne conformance as a relation between a principal and another principal w.r.t. a set of laws:
Deﬁnition 17 (Conformance). Given a state swith a set of objects O, a body of regulation Reg, and {A, B} ⊆ OP , we say that A
conforms to B w.r.t. the laws IdB ⊆ l(B) and a ﬁxed point (U,U ′) with U = U ′ iff for all propositional ϕ ∈ LϕA :
If (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdBOAϕ, then (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ.
In other words, conformance is the satisfaction of all obligations. The syntactic restrictions in Deﬁnition 1 justify the
restriction to ϕ ∈ LϕA , as these are the only formulas that can appear within the scope of OA. The restriction to ﬁxed points
(U,U ′), where U = U ′, ensures that all formulas are either true or false. Deﬁnition 17 is not appropriate when U = U ′, since
classically provable formulas, e.g. ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, may be ungrounded. In such cases, the principal would be found (trivially) non-
conformant. One way to accommodate these cases is to modify Deﬁnition 17 so that if (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdBOAϕ, we require
only that ϕ be true or ungrounded. With this modiﬁcation, our proof of decidability carries over to the case where U = U ′.
Let us apply Deﬁnition 17 to our example from HIPAA in Table 1 (Section 3.3). As we discussed, we are interested in the
conformance of Bob (B). Bob does not conform to Alice (A) w.r.t. the law l(A) = {2}, because (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysl(A)OBsaysl(B)
PAaccess(A, r) and (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysl(B)PAaccess(A, r). However, it can be shown that Bob conforms to HIPAA (H), w.r.t. the
laws {1,1a,1b} = l(H). We will discuss additional examples in Section 4.2.
We now discuss the proof of decidability of conformance. Given a state s and a ﬁxed point (U,U ′), there are potentially
inﬁnitelymany formulas ϕ ∈ LϕA such that (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdBOAϕ. For example, if there is some ϕ such that (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′)
saysIdBOAϕ, then for all ϕ′ ∈ LϕA , we have (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdBOA(ϕ ∨ ϕ′). We will prove that it sufﬁces to restrict attention
to a single formula, which may be understood as a prime implicant of all the obligations imposed on A via the laws IdB.
The proof relies on properties of the canonical model of a formula (Deﬁnition 6). We begin with some notation. Given
φ ∈ L, letMφ = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO) be the canonical model of φ. Recall that each state  ∈ S is a maximal consistent set of
subformulas of φ, i.e.,  ⊆ sub(φ). Given  ∈ S and IdB ⊆ l(B), IdB is the set such that ϕ ∈ IdB iff there exists Id′B ⊆ IdB such
that saysId′
B
ϕ ∈ . Similarly, given  ∈ S and A ∈ OP , A is the set such that ϕ ∈ A iff OAϕ ∈ .
We now establish some properties of maximal consistent sets that are useful in the proof.
Proposition 12. Given φ ∈ L, let Mφ = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO) be the canonical model of φ. The following hold for all ϕ ∈ LϕA ,
ψ ∈ Lψ and  ∈ S:
1. If for all ′ ∈ δ′L(, A), ′  ϕ, then   OAϕ.
2. If for all ′ ∈ δL(, IdB), ′  ψ , then   saysIdBψ .
3. If   saysIdBOAϕ, then for all ′ ∈ δL(, IdB), ′A  ϕ.
Proof. For the ﬁrst two items, we will need the following observation. Given 	 ⊆ sub(φ), let S	 ⊆ S be the set such that
 ∈ S	 iff 	 ⊆ . Then, for all ϕ ∈ L:
(*) 	  ϕ iff for all  ∈ S	 ,   ϕ.
This follows using propositional reasoning, since S is the set of all maximal consistent sets w.r.t. sub(ϕ), and S	 is the set of
all maximal consistent sets containing 	.
Item 1: Consider ϕ ∈ LϕA such that for all ′ ∈ δ′L(, A), ′  ϕ. By construction, δL(, A) = SA , and by (*), A  ϕ. Using R2,
 OA(
∧
A ⇒ ϕ). Since   OA(
∧
A), using A2,   OAϕ. The proof of item 2 is similar.
Item 3:We proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists ϕ ∈ LϕA and  ∈ S such that   saysIdBOAϕ, and ′A  ϕ for some
′ ∈ δL(, IdB). So, there exists a model M′ = (S′, I′1 , . . . , I′n , δ′L, δ′O) and s¬ϕ ∈ S′ such that (M′, s¬ϕ) |=
∧
′
A
and (M′, s¬ϕ) |=
¬ϕ. We construct a new modelM′′ = (S′′, I′′1 , . . . , I′′n , δ′′L, δ′′O) combiningMφ andM′ as follows:• S′′ = S ∪ S′. We assume that S and S′ are disjoint.
• The interpretation of predicates respects those inMφ andM′.
• δ′′L respects the accessibility relations δL and δ′L.
• δ′′O respects the accessibility relations δO and δ′O , except that:
δ′′O(′, A) = δO(′, A) ∪ {s¬ϕ}.
The satisfaction of the constraints C3–C6 is immediate from the construction, as the only modiﬁcation is to δ′′O(′, A). The
following are established easily by induction:
(1) For all s ∈ S′, (M′′, s) |= ψ iff (M′, s) |= ψ .
(2) For all  ∈ S and ψ ∈ sub(∧U), (M′′,) |= ψ iff ψ ∈ .
We can now reason as follows:
(3) (M′′,) |=∧ (using (2)).
(4) (M′′, s¬ϕ) |= ϕ (using (1)).
(5) (M′′,′) |= OAϕ (from (4) since s¬ϕ ∈ δ′′O(′, A)).
(6) (M′′,) |= saysIdBOAϕ (from (5) since ′ ∈ δ′′L(, IdB)).
(7)   saysIdBOAϕ (from (3) and (6), by soundness).
Item (7) contradicts the assumption that   saysIdBOAϕ. 
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We are now ready to show that conformance checking is decidable:
Theorem 5 (Decidability of conformance). Given a state S, a body of regulation Reg, a ﬁxed point (U,U ′) where U = U ′ and |U|
is ﬁnite, principals {A, B} ⊆ OP, and identiﬁers IdB ⊆ l(B), there is a procedure to decide whether A conforms to B w.r.t. the laws
IdB.
Proof. First, we observe that for all ϕ ∈ LϕA , (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) saysIdBOAϕ iff U  saysIdBOAϕ (by deﬁnition). So, it sufﬁces to
check that for all ϕ ∈ LϕA , if U  saysIdBOAϕ, then (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ.
The key idea is to show that there is a formula ϕU ∈ LϕA such that:
(P1) U  saysIdBOAϕU , and
(P2) For all ϕ ∈ LϕA such that U  saysIdBOAϕ, we have  ϕU ⇒ ϕ.
Assuming that such a ϕU exists, we can show the following:
• A conforms to B w.r.t. IdB iff (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU .
IfA conforms toBw.r.t. IdB, sinceU  saysIdBOAϕU ,wehave (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU . For theotherdirection,weneed theobservation
that for all φ ∈ LϕA , if  φ, then (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) φ. Note that this claim does not hold when U = U ′. When U = U ′, the claim
is easily veriﬁed by showing that the axioms A1–A3, A5, and A6 are valid at s w.r.t. (U,U ′), and that the rules R1 and
R2 preserved validity. Instances of axiom schema A4 are not in LϕA . Now suppose that (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU . For all ϕ ∈ LϕA
such that U  saysIdBOAϕ, we have (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU ⇒ ϕ (using (P2)), and since (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU , (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕ. Thus,
if (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU , then A conforms to B w.r.t. IdB. Since checking whether (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ϕU is decidable, conformance
checking is decidable, provided that such a ϕU exists.
We now turn to the construction of ϕU . LetMU = (S, I1 , . . . , In , δL, δO) be the canonical model for
∧
U. Let SU = {1|1 ∈
S and U ⊆ 1}. We will now deﬁne a formula ϕ for each  ∈ SU , and deﬁne ϕU as their disjunction:
ϕ =
∨
′∈δL(,IdB)
∧
′A ϕU =
∨
∈SU
ϕ.
We claim the following for all  ∈ S:
(P3)   saysIdBOAϕ.
(P4) For all ϕ ∈ L, if   saysIdBOAϕ, then  ϕ ⇒ ϕ.
Proof of (P3).Using propositional reasoning, for all′ ∈ δL(, IdB) and′′ ∈ δO(′, A),′′  ϕ. Hence, for all′ ∈ δL(, IdB),
by Proposition 12 Item 1, we have ′  OAϕ. And using, Proposition 12 Item 2,   saysIdBOAϕ.
Proof of (P4). Suppose   saysIdBOAϕ. By Proposition 12 Item 3, for all ′ ∈ δL(, IdB), ′A  ϕ. And, using propositional
reasoning,  ϕ ⇒ ϕ.
Proof of (P1). Using (P3), for all  ∈ SU , we have   saysIdBOAϕ. And, by propositional reasoning, U  saysIdBOAϕ (since
SU is the set of all maximal consistent sets containing U).
Proof of (P2). Using (P4), for all ϕ ∈ L, if U  saysIdBOAϕ, then   saysIdBOAϕ for all  ∈ SU . Hence,  ϕ ⇒ ϕ for all  ∈ SU ,
and by propositional reasoning,  ϕU ⇒ ϕ. 
4. Discussion
In this section, we discuss how various constructs from the literature are expressed in our framework. In Section 4.1, we
discuss access control examples. Section 4.2 discusses conformance in the presence of nested obligations and permissions.
We then discuss other relationships to prior work, in Section 4.3.
4.1. Access control
We discuss two access control examples in this section. The ﬁrst example highlights an important restriction of the
policies in Section 3.3, i.e., a policy lets us conclude what has been said, but not what actually happens. The second example
illustrates how the delegation operator of Li et al. [39] can be deﬁned in our framework.
Example 1. We begin with an example from Garg and Abadi [16]. Consider a ﬁle-access scenario with an administrating
principal (A), a user (B), a ﬁle (ﬁle1), and the following policy:
1. If A says that ﬁle1 should be deleted, then this must be the case.
2. A trusts B to decide whether ﬁle1 should be deleted.
3. B wants to delete ﬁle1.
We introduce a new principal F for the ﬁle system. The following are the utterances (U) obtained at the ﬁxed point:
1. saysl(F)PAsaysl(A)OF (delﬁle1).
2. saysl(A)PBsaysl(B)OF (delﬁle1).
3. saysl(B)OF (delﬁle1).
The ﬁrst utterance is read as follows: The ﬁle system F says that A is permitted to require it (F) to delete ﬁle1. The second
utterance is the delegation from A to B, and the third utterance is B’s wish to delete ﬁle1. Using A5, we will conclude that
U  saysl(F)OF (delﬁle1). In other words, we conclude that the system requires itself to delete ﬁle1.
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Our analysis differs in an important way from Garg and Abadi [16]. We do not conclude that ﬁle1 is actually deleted, i.e.,
U  delﬁle1. In fact, we can show that there is no policy (as deﬁned in Section 3.3) that lets us make this conclusion. delﬁle1
is true at a state where F conforms to l(F), as per Deﬁnition 17. In some cases, it may be warranted to assume/axiomatize
self-conformance, i.e., (saysl(F)OF (ϕ)) ⇒ ϕ. However, conﬂicting self-imposed requirements would make U inconsistent.
Example 2. The delegation operator of Li et al. [39] has a compelling deﬁnition in our framework. The syntax (in [39]) for
delegation is “x delegates (ϕ)d to y”, where d is the depth of delegation. We deﬁne the schema ps(ϕ, x, d), where x is used to
generate variable names, and d ∈ N:
• ps(ϕ, x,1) = Px1 saysl(x1)ϕ.• ps(ϕ, x, d) = Pxdsaysl(xd)(ϕ ∧ ps(ϕ, x, d − 1)), for d > 1.
The statement “A delegates (delﬁle1)2 to B” is interpreted as follows: A says delﬁle1 if B says it or anyone that B trusts says
it. Suppose, in addition, that B delegates (delﬁle1)1 to C, and C says delﬁle1. We express this with the following rules:
• (1) (x2 = B) → ps(delﬁle1, x,2).
• (2) (y1 = C) → ps(delﬁle1, y,1).
• (3)  → delﬁle1.
We assume that 1 ∈ l(A), 2 ∈ l(B) and 3 ∈ l(C). At the ﬁxed point, we will have U  saysl(A)delﬁle1, i.e., A says delﬁle1. Further
re-delegations by C (by modifying statement 3) will not be attributed to A.
In the logic of Li et al. [39], a representation statement is used to grant permission to speakwithout consuming delegation
depth. If C represents B on delﬁle1, then C should be permitted to at most one re-delegation. Statement 2 is modiﬁed as
follows:
• (2) (y2 = C) → ps(delﬁle1, y,2).
With this modiﬁcation, a delegation by C will be attributed to A. The reader may have noticed the similarity between
statement 1 and the modiﬁed version of statement 2. In our approach, delegation is just a special kind of representation. A
delegates (ϕ)d to B iff B represents A on “delegating (ϕ)d−1 to anyone”. If C represents B on “delegating (ϕ)d−1 to anyone”,
then she represents A as well.
As Li et al. [39] point out, in the presence of representation, delegation depth does not havemuchmeaning. For example, A
may not wish to trust C to the same extent as B. There are a few options to address this issue bymodifying the representation
axiom. One way is to keep track of the delegation depth in the axiom, as in the SECPal language [7]. Yet another way is to
keep track of the principal on behalf of whom a statement in made. We avoid these modiﬁcations, to simplify presentation.
4.2. Nested obligations and permissions
We discuss two examples of conformance in the presence of nested obligations and permissions. The ﬁrst example
illustrates how several ﬁne-grained notions of conformance can be captured, and is intended to supplement the example
from HIPAA in Section 3. The second example points out an important practical difﬁculty.
Example 1. Consider the following law:
(6) The owners of parking lots ought to forbid parking near the entrance.
What does itmean to conform to (6)?We analyze this sentence as follows: “The owners of parking lots ought to (introduce
laws that) forbid parking near the entrance.” In other words, (6) is an obligation to introduce a prohibition. If the owner
introduces such a law, then the person parking is viewed as non-conformant, but it is the owner that needs to conform to
(6). We can represent (6) in logic as follows:
(6) own(x) ∧ p(y) → Oxsaysl(x)Oy¬pk(y, x).
Here own(x) is true iff x is the owner of a parking lot, p(y) is true iff y is a person, and pk(y, x) is true iff y parks near the
entrance of the lot owned by x. l(x) refers to the laws that are introduced by x.
Let us assume a state s = (I1 , . . . , In ) inwhich A is the owner of a parking lot, and B parks near the entrances of A’s lot. The
true predications are: {own(A), p(B), pk(B, A)}. In addition, A is assigned the identiﬁer 7, i.e., l(A) = {7}. We will now consider
two scenarios – (a) A does not introduce any laws, and (b) A introduces a law forbidding parking near the entrance. We are
interested in the conformance (Deﬁnition 17) of the owner A and the driver B.
Scenario 1: Suppose that A does not introduce any laws. The ﬁxed point utterance pair is:
U = U ′ = {says{6}OAsays{7}OB¬pk(B, A)}.
In this case, A does not conform to {6} because:
• U  says{6}OAsays{7}OB¬pk(B, A), but
• (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) says{7}OB¬pk(B, A).
However, it can be shown that B conforms to {6}.
Scenario 2: Now suppose that A introduces the law:
(7) p(y) → Oy¬pk(y, A).
The ﬁxed point utterance pair is:
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U = U ′ = {says{6}OAsays{7}OB¬pk(B, A), says{7}OB¬pk(B, A)}.
It can be shown that A conforms to {6}. What about B? It is clear that B does not conform to {7}, but what about {6}? Observe
that U  says{6}OB¬pk(B, A) (using the representation axiom A5), but (s,Reg) |=(U,U ′) ¬pk(B, A). Hence, B does not conform
to {6}. In other words, the statement (6) conveys an obligation to A and if A conforms, the embedded obligation is conveyed
to B. As we noted in Section 2.1, we are formalizing the notion of speaking on someone’s behalf, i.e., the obligation (7) issued
by A is understood as being on behalf of the issuer of (6). Some applications may need a distinction between the different
senses of saying.
Example 2. Consider the following example:
(8) You are required to allow a patient to see his records.
By our analysis, (8) is an obligation on the hospital to provide a permission. Suppose that a hospital introduces such a
permission in its policy. Has it conformed to (8)? The problem arises in distinguishing between claimed permission, and actual
permission. A hospital claims that it permits a patient to see his records, by making an appropriate rule. On the other hand,
a hospital actually permits a patient to see his records, by taking an action, e.g., sending the records via mail.
We suggest that a formalization of actual permission needs notions of bringing about or seeing to it that (e.g. [8,32]). If a
principal A says that she permits an action p, we need to check if she prevents p either by some other action or non-action.
We leave an investigation of this issue to future work.
4.3. Related work
We have discussed several relationships to prior work, in Sections 2, 4.1, and 4.2. In this section, we discuss other
relationships, to identify interesting lines for further research.
Logic programming has been popular in access control [9,12,39]. The formalism that we adopted (Section 3.3) provides
a way to integrate the logic programming approaches with the logics of saying [1–3,16,17], i.e., by evaluating saying using
provability. The negation of provability gives a good interpretation to didn’t say, thereby establishing a connection be-
tween saying and non-monotonic reasoning. Non-monotonic reasoning plays a useful role in formalizing exceptions to laws
[5,44,51]. With regard to the introduction of modalities in utterances, our approach follows in the spirit of [23,26], where
defeasible logic is extended to include modalities. It is of interest to obtain a formal characterization of the relationships.
The non-interference theorem (Section 3.4) can be used to obtain relevant utterances for access control in a distributed
setting. The techniques for distributed proofs, developed by [6], are directly applicable here. However, the provability tests
U  saysl(A)ψ can be expensive, if U is large. Logic programs restrict the heads of rules to be atomic (as in [9,12,39]). This
restriction to atomic formulas lets one decide provability in polynomial time. An important question is whether similar
restrictions can be applied here to get polytime fragments. Disjunction is the main culprit, and leads to exponential worst-
case complexities. Even if we exclude disjunction syntactically, the representation axiom can lead to constraints involving
disjunction, as we saw in Propositions 3 and 5. This leads to the following question: Is there a fragment of the logic that
accommodates representation, and yields a polytime decision procedure?
Due to the problematic interactions between hand-off and classical logic (Section 2.1), intuitionistic approaches have
been developed [2,16,17]. While we have focused on the classical setting here, the representation axiom can be adapted
to the intuitionistic setting. However, as [17] point out, a notion of constructivism is also desirable in an intuitionistic
logic. Constructivism requires the meaning of an operator to be independent of others, and as a result, axioms which
describe interaction between operators (such as the representation axiom) are excluded. While constructivism is important
in programming languages (see [2,17]), interaction axioms have also proved useful. For example, [30] discuss 48 systems of
knowledge and time. This leads to our next question: Is there a more constructive form of the representation axiom, that yields
a useful programming language?
Finally, notions of time have been used in conformance checking [13,19,38]. The policies are used to synthesize monitors
that are used to detect violations at runtime [13,38]. Since the saying component (Section 3.3) uses the formalism in [13,14],
notions of linear time can be easily added here, and the monitor synthesis in [13] can be used directly. Once notions of time
are available, we can place constraints on how a policy changes [24,25]. This leads to our ﬁnal question: Are there useful
interactions between saying and time, to characterize how a policy is updated?
5. Conclusions
We have motivated and described a logic for access control and conformance. The focus was on the interaction be-
tween saying and permission, as needed for these applications. We proposed two axioms to characterize their interaction
(Section 3.2), and showed how these axioms could be incorporated into a logic programming approach (Section 3.3).
A combined analysis of saying and permission yielded beneﬁts to both applications. For access control, we ﬁnd a way
to avoid the problematic interaction between hand-off and classical reasoning. Our axioms yield a decidable logic with
a complete semantics (Section 3.2), and we hope that they have intuitive appeal to the reader. For conformance, we
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obtained a characterization of legal power by nesting saying with obligation and permission. We showed, in Section 3.5,
that conformance checking remains decidable.
We believe that the joint study of access control and conformance is a rich area for research. In Section 4.3, we identiﬁed
avenues for further inquiry.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed and helpful comments on earlier versions of this
paper.
References
[1] M. Abadi, Logic in access control, in: Proceedings of the Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, 2003, pp. 228–233.
[2] M. Abadi, Access control in a core calculus of dependency, Electron. Notes Theor. Comput. Sci., 172 (2007) 5–31.
[3] M. Abadi, M. Burrows, B. Lampson, G. Plotkin, A calculus for access control in distributed systems, ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 15 (4) (1993)
706–734.
[4] A. Abrahams, Developing and executing electronic commerce applications with occurrences, Ph.D. Thesis, Univerisity of Cambridge, 2002.
[5] C. Alchourron, D. Makinson, Hierarchies of regulation and their logic, in: R. Hilpinen (Ed.), New Studies in Deontic Logic, Reidel, 1981, pp. 125–148.
[6] L. Bauer, S. Garriss, M.K. Reiter, Distributed proving in access control systems, in: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer Security Foundation Symposium,
2007, pp. 81–95.
[7] M.Y. Becker, C. Fournet, A.D. Gordon, Design and semantics of a decentralized authorization language, in: Computer Security Foundations Symposium,
2007, pp. 3–15.
[8] N.D. Belnap, P. Bartha, Marcus and the problem of nested deontic modalities, in:W. Sinnot-Armstrong, D. Raffman, N. Asher (Eds.), Morality and Belief:
Festschrift in Honour of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 174–197.
[9] E. Bertino, B. Catania, E. Ferrari, P. Perlasca, A logical framework for reasoning about access control models, ACM Trans. Inform. Syst. Security 6 (1)
(2003) 71–127.
[10] T.D. Breaux, M.W. Vail, A.I. Anton, Towards regulatory compliance: extracting rights and obligations to align requirements with regulations, in:
Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Requirements Engineering Conference, 2006, pp. 46–55.
[11] A. Cirillo, R. Jagadeesan, C. Pitcher, J. Riely, Do as I SaY! Programmatic access control with explicit identities, in: Proceedings of the IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Symposium, 2007, pp. 16–30.
[12] J. Crampton, G. Loizou, G.O. Shea, A logic of access control, Comput. J. 44 (1) (2001) 137–149.
[13] N. Dinesh, A. Joshi, I. Lee, O. Sokolsky, Checking traces for regulatory conformance, in: Proceedings of the Workshop on Runtime Veriﬁcation, 2008,
pp. 86–103.
[14] N. Dinesh, A. Joshi, I. Lee, O. Sokolsky, Reasoning about conditions and exceptions to laws in regulatory conformance checking, in: Proceedings of the
Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science, 2008, pp. 110–124.
[15] M. Fitting, A Kripke/Kleene Semantics for logic programs, J. Logic Programming 2 (4) (1985) 295–312.
[16] D. Garg, M. Abadi, A modal deconstruction of access control logics, in: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Foundations of Software
Science and Computation Structures (FoSSaCS), 2008, pp. 216–230.
[17] D. Garg, F. Pfenning, Non-interference in constructive authorization logic, in: 19th IEEE Computer Security FoundationsWorkshop, 2006, pp. 283–296.
[18] J. Gelati, G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, G. Sartor, Normative autonomy and normative co-ordination: declarative power, representation, and mandate,
Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law 12 (1–2) (2004) 53–81.
[19] C. Giblin, A. Liu, S. Muller, B. Pﬁtzmann, X. Zhou, Regulations expressed as logical models (REALM), in: Legal Knowledge and Information Systems
(JURIX), 2005, pp. 37–48.
[20] G. Governatori, Representing business contracts in rule ml, Int. J. Coop. Inform. Syst. 14 (2–3) (2005) 181–216.
[21] G. Governatori, Z. Milosevic, S. Sadiq, Compliance checking between business processes and business contracts, in: 10th International Enterprise
Distributed Object Computing Conference (EDOC), 2006, pp. 221–232.
[22] G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, Logic of violations: a gentzen system for reasoning with contrary-to-duty obligations, Austral. J. Logic 4 (2006) 193–215.
[23] G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, Bio logical agents: norms, beliefs, intentions in defeasible logic, Autonomous Agents Multi-Agent Syst. 17 (1) (2008) 36–69.
[24] G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, Changing legal systems: abrogation and annulment. Part I: Revision of defeasible theories, in: Deontic Logic in Computer
Science, 2008, pp. 3–18.
[25] G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, Changing legal systems: abrogation and annulment. Part II: Temporalised defeasible logic, in:NormativeMulti Agent Systems,
2008, pp. 112–127.
[26] G. Governatori, A. Rotolo, A computational framework for institutional agency, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law 16 (1) (2008) 25–52.
[27] B. Grosof, Y. Labrou, H.Y. Chan, A declarative approach to business rules in contracts: Courteous logic programs in xml, in: ACMConference on Electronic
Commerce, 1999, pp. 68–77.
[28] J.Y. Halpern, Multi-agent only knowing, J. Logic Comput. 11 (1) (2001) 41–70.
[29] J.Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, A guide to the completeness and complexity for modal logics of knowledge and belief, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 54 (3) (1992)
319–379.
[30] J.Y. Halpern, R. van derMeyden,M.Y. Vardi, Complete axiomatizations for reasoning about knowledge and time, SIAM J. Comput. 33 (3) (2004) 674–703.
[31] W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning, Yale Law J. 23 (1913) 16–59.
[32] J.F. Horty, N.D. Belnap, The deliberative stit: a study of action, omission, ability, and obligation, J. Phil. Logic 29 (1995) 109–136.
[33] A.J.I. Jones, M.J. Sergot, Deontic logic in the representation of law: towards a methodology, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law 1 (1992) 45–64.
[34] A.J.I. Jones, M.J. Sergot, Formal speciﬁcation of security requirements using the theory of normative positions, in: European Symposium on Research
in Computer Security (ESORICS), 1992, pp. 103–121.
[35] A.J.I. Jones, M.J. Sergot, A formal characterization of institutionalized power, J. IGPL 4 (3) (1996) 429–445.
[36] S. Kanger, Law and logic, Theoria 38 (1972) 105–132.
[37] S. Kripke, Outline of a theory of truth, J. Phil. 72 (1975) 690–716.
[38] M. Kyas, C. Prisacariu, G. Schneider, Run-time monitoring of electronic contracts, in: 6th International Symposium on Automated Technology for
Veriﬁcation and Analysis (ATVA’08), 2008, pp. 397–407.
[39] N. Li, B.N. Grosof, J. Feigenbaum, Delegation logic: a logic-based approach to distributed authorization, ACM Trans. Inform. Syst. Security 6 (1) (2003)
128–171.
[40] L. Lindahl, Position and change: a study in law and logic. Synthese Library 112, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977.
[41] D. Makinson, General patterns in non-monotonic reasoning, in: D. Gabbay, C. Hogger, J. Robinson (Eds.), Handbook of Logic in Artiﬁcial Intelligence
and Logic Programming, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 35–110.
[42] D. Makinson, L. van der Torre, Input/output logics, J. Phil. Logic 29 (2000) 383–408.
74 N. Dinesh et al. / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 80 (2011) 50–74
[43] L.T. McCarty, A language for legal discourse – I. Basic features, in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law, 1989,
pp. 180–189.
[44] L.T. McCarty, W.W. Cohen, The case for explicit exceptions, in: Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning,
1990, pp. 81–94.
[45] N.H. Minsky, D. Rozenshtein, System = program + users + law, in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law, 1987,
pp. 170–180.
[46] R.C. Moore, Semantical considerations on non-monotonic logic, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 25 (1985) 272–279.
[47] D. Nute, Defeasible reasoning, in: Proceedings of the Hawaii International Conference on System Science, 1987, pp. 470–477.
[48] H. Prakken, M. Sergot, Contrary-to-duty obligations, Studia Logica 57 (1) (1996) 91–115.
[49] R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Artiﬁcial Intelligence 13 (1980) 81–132.
[50] W. Rudin, Real and Complex Analysis, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987.
[51] G. Sartor, The structure of norm conditions and nonmonotonic reasoning in law, in: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Artiﬁcial
Intelligence and Law, 1991, pp. 155–164.
[52] M.J. Sergot, F. Sadri, R.A. Kowalski, F. Kriwaczek, P. Hammond, H.T. Cory, The British Nationality Act as a logic program, Commun. ACM 29 (5) (1986)
370–386.
[53] G.H. von Wright, Deontic logic, Mind 60 (1951) 1–15.
